Friday, June 12, 2015
Thursday, June 11, 2015
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Analysing Google's Public Response to the EC's Statement of Objections
Foundem, here.
(Cool interactive presentation, possibly created with Visme - whose licence is a little expensive, though).
(Cool interactive presentation, possibly created with Visme - whose licence is a little expensive, though).
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platform
Z. Cullen, C. Farronato, here.
Monday, June 08, 2015
User Reputation: Building Trust and Addressing Privacy Issues in the Sharing Economy
Future of Privacy Forum, here.
Avis concernant un projet de décret et un projet d’arrêté relatifs au transport public particulier de personnes
Autorité de la concurrence, ici.
Sunday, June 07, 2015
Friday, June 05, 2015
Thursday, June 04, 2015
Tuesday, June 02, 2015
App Maker Files EU Complaint Against Google, Alleging Abuse of Android Dominance
WSJ.com, here.
"Disconnect said Google abused its dominant position in Europe’s mobile market to unfairly discriminate against Disconnect and favor its own privacy and security software. The moves limited Europeans’ access to competing privacy and security software, while letting Google and others track and collect Android users’ information for advertising, Disconnect said...The app maker alleged Google pulled Disconnect because the software disrupted Google’s tracking and advertising efforts, the source of most of the Internet company’s revenue and profit. In an email included in the complaint, a Play store employee said the app was removed because it prevented other apps from delivering ads....A Google spokesman called Disconnect’s claims “baseless.” Google has allowed more than 200 other privacy apps in the Play store, but blocks any apps that alter other apps’ functionality or remove their way of making money, he added, saying Google applies this policy uniformly, with strong support from Android developers...Google abused its dominance in mobile operating systems and the app market by “tying” its own software and security to those platforms, Disconnect said in its complaint. That gave its services an unfair advantage over Disconnect’s rival software, reducing competition and consumer choice in the market for privacy and security software, the developer said. Google’s removal of the app also illegally discriminated against Disconnect because Google’s own privacy and security software, which it includes by default in its Android operating system, isn't held to the same standards, Disconnect argued."
More about Disconnect here.
More about Disconnect here.
Monday, June 01, 2015
Sunday, May 31, 2015
Saturday, May 30, 2015
Friday, May 29, 2015
Thursday, May 28, 2015
How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem”
A. Hobson, C. Koopman, C. Kuiper and A. Thierer, here.
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
Android and Antitrust: Attempts at a “More Technological Approach”
S. Vezzoso (this blog's author), Working Paper here (Wavesblog's readers comments more than welcome).
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thursday, May 21, 2015
Frenemies in Platform Markets: The Case of Apple's iPad vs. Amazon's Kindle
R. Adner, J. Chen, F. Zhu, here.
Showing films and other audiovisual content in European Schools:Obstacles and best practices
Study prepared for the European Commission, here.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Aperta un'istruttoria sui diritti televisivi della serie A
AGCM, Provvedimento qui.
"Le notizie di stampa in atti sembrano indicare che l’assetto finale per l’assegnazione dei diritti audiovisivi per il triennio 2015/2018 come sopra descritto non discenda da un confronto competitivo fra gli operatori interessati, ma sia stato il frutto di un accordo, realizzato successivamente all’espletamento della gara che ha determinato un esito delle assegnazioni diverso da quello inizialmente risultante dalla stessa procedura di gara".
"Le notizie di stampa in atti sembrano indicare che l’assetto finale per l’assegnazione dei diritti audiovisivi per il triennio 2015/2018 come sopra descritto non discenda da un confronto competitivo fra gli operatori interessati, ma sia stato il frutto di un accordo, realizzato successivamente all’espletamento della gara che ha determinato un esito delle assegnazioni diverso da quello inizialmente risultante dalla stessa procedura di gara".
Monday, May 18, 2015
Saturday, May 16, 2015
Friday, May 15, 2015
Stuttgarter Taxi-Zentrale geht gegen "myTaxi"-App vor
Heise.de, hier.
"Daimler ist außerordentliches Mitglied im Deutschen Taxi- und Mietwagenverband (BZP) und liefert nach Verbandsangaben rund 60 Prozent der Fahrzeuge."
"Daimler ist außerordentliches Mitglied im Deutschen Taxi- und Mietwagenverband (BZP) und liefert nach Verbandsangaben rund 60 Prozent der Fahrzeuge."
Thursday, May 14, 2015
Online Copyright Enforcement, Consumer Behavior, and Market Structure
L. Aguiar, J. Claussen, C. Peukert, here.
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
Sanzioni per 13 milioni a due società di servizio ristoro su rete autostradale
I775, Provvedimento qui.
For the Net by the Net: Initial thoughts on India’s Save the Internet Campaign
A. Singh and N. George, here.
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
GC: documents exchanged between the Commission and a national competition authority in proceedings concerning an infringement of the competition rules are not, in principle, accessible to the public
Case T-623/13, Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España v Commission, here.
Monday, May 11, 2015
Internet firms: Eat or be eaten
TheEconomist, here.
“The advantage you have with the internet is that the regulatory regimes are not as aware about the dominance you can create in platforms, and therefore you can create monopolies,” says a big investor in internet stocks."
“The advantage you have with the internet is that the regulatory regimes are not as aware about the dominance you can create in platforms, and therefore you can create monopolies,” says a big investor in internet stocks."
Sunday, May 10, 2015
Saturday, May 09, 2015
Friday, May 08, 2015
Sixth Annual Conference on Internet Search and Innovation
Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, June 4-5 2015, Agenda here.
Thursday, May 07, 2015
Le Groupement National des Indépendants (GNI) gagne contre Expedia
Hotellerie.de, ici.
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
CA Supreme Court on pay for delay
Cipro I & II, here.
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
Rival music services say Apple's App Store pricing is anticompetitive
TheVerge, here.
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
Egalité d'accès de tous les professionnels aux réservations du refuge du Goûter (Mont Blanc)
Autorité de la concurrence, ici.
(Un grand bravo à l'Autorité, mais elle a encore du boulot, dans la vallée de Chamonix - un monopole skiable).
(Un grand bravo à l'Autorité, mais elle a encore du boulot, dans la vallée de Chamonix - un monopole skiable).
Wednesday, May 06, 2015
Entente dans le secteur de la commercialisation de la viande de volaille (poulet, dinde, canard, lapin, etc.)
Autorité de la concurrence, ici. Décision ici.
"En raison des circonstances très particulières de cette affaire, l'Autorité a considéré que l'engagement collectif de mettre en place une interprofession dans un calendrier contraint, pris par des industriels représentant l'essentiel du marché est susceptible d'avoir, pour le respect durable des règles de la concurrence dans le secteur de la viande de volaille, une plus grande efficacité que des sanctions pécuniaires calculées selon la méthode habituelle."
A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe
EC, here.
"The Commission will...comprehensively analyse the role of online platforms (search engines, social media, app stores, etc.) in the market. This will cover issues such as the non-transparency of search results and of pricing policies, how they use the information they acquire, relationships between platforms and suppliers and the promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors – to the extent these are not already covered by competition law. It will also look into how to best tackle illegal content on the Internet."
Staff working paper here.
"The accumulation and use of data by certain market players can contribute to their market power, in particular in their relationship with the data suppliers", p. 53.
"Some platforms act as a marketplace and a retailer at the same time. These platforms may use the transactional data acquired from business users of the marketplace segment to enhance the performance of the platform's retail arm. This can lead to discrimination in listing between platforms' own services and third party services. Companies may also complain that they do not get access to the data collected through transactions linked to their "products", p. 55.
"some platforms simply forbid companies from selling more cheaply elsewhere (including the seller's own website, other platforms and all offline distribution channels). The issue has already been examined by various competition authorities", id.
"Given the dynamics of the markets created and served by platforms, and the relatively short time that they have been in existence, more work is needed to gather comprehensive and reliable evidence on how different types of platform work and their effects on their customers and the economy as a whole. On the basis of such an evidence base, an assessment can be made of the nature of the problems that may arise from their pivotal role in the digital economy and whether existing regulatory tools are sufficient to tackle them, or whether new tools need to be developed" id.
"The Commission will...comprehensively analyse the role of online platforms (search engines, social media, app stores, etc.) in the market. This will cover issues such as the non-transparency of search results and of pricing policies, how they use the information they acquire, relationships between platforms and suppliers and the promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors – to the extent these are not already covered by competition law. It will also look into how to best tackle illegal content on the Internet."
Staff working paper here.
"The accumulation and use of data by certain market players can contribute to their market power, in particular in their relationship with the data suppliers", p. 53.
"Some platforms act as a marketplace and a retailer at the same time. These platforms may use the transactional data acquired from business users of the marketplace segment to enhance the performance of the platform's retail arm. This can lead to discrimination in listing between platforms' own services and third party services. Companies may also complain that they do not get access to the data collected through transactions linked to their "products", p. 55.
"some platforms simply forbid companies from selling more cheaply elsewhere (including the seller's own website, other platforms and all offline distribution channels). The issue has already been examined by various competition authorities", id.
"Given the dynamics of the markets created and served by platforms, and the relatively short time that they have been in existence, more work is needed to gather comprehensive and reliable evidence on how different types of platform work and their effects on their customers and the economy as a whole. On the basis of such an evidence base, an assessment can be made of the nature of the problems that may arise from their pivotal role in the digital economy and whether existing regulatory tools are sufficient to tackle them, or whether new tools need to be developed" id.
Tuesday, May 05, 2015
Friday, May 01, 2015
Thursday, April 30, 2015
Brussels to probe online search listings
FT, here.
"Brussels will this year launch a probe into online platforms such as Amazon and Google examining the way they list search results and how they use customer data...The investigation will look at the role of paid for links and advertisements in search results, along with the ability of individuals and businesses to move from platform to platform"
"Brussels will this year launch a probe into online platforms such as Amazon and Google examining the way they list search results and how they use customer data...The investigation will look at the role of paid for links and advertisements in search results, along with the ability of individuals and businesses to move from platform to platform"
Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Tuesday, April 28, 2015
No Mistake About it: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data
A. Grunes, M. Stucke, here.
Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition
A. Ezrachi, M. Stucke, here.
Across Platform Parity Agreements (APPAs): CMA Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation
A. Crisholm, Presentation here (download).
Friday, April 24, 2015
Invention as a combinatorial process: evidence from US patents
H.Youn, D. Strumsky, L. Bettencourt, J. Lobo, here.
Intellectual Property and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry
AGCM, Conference presentations available here.
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
Homo economicus and Homo sapiens: The CMA experience of behavioural economics
D. Currie, here.
(Terrific read - and compulsory for the students attending my upcoming Fall Antitrust Course)
(Terrific read - and compulsory for the students attending my upcoming Fall Antitrust Course)
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Friday, April 17, 2015
Thursday, April 16, 2015
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
EU Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android
Press Release, here.
Commissioner Vestager's statement here.
Minutes of the meeting of the Commission here (on Android: "She pointed out that Google had led development of the Android mobile operating system since 2005, and the majority of smartphone and tablet manufacturers used this system, having concluded agreements with Google to obtain the right to install Google's applications on their devices. She explained that the Commission's in-depth investigation would focus on whether, by doing so, Google had breached EU antitrust rules by hindering the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications and services to the detriment of consumers and developers of innovative services and products").
Commissioner Vestager's statement here.
Minutes of the meeting of the Commission here (on Android: "She pointed out that Google had led development of the Android mobile operating system since 2005, and the majority of smartphone and tablet manufacturers used this system, having concluded agreements with Google to obtain the right to install Google's applications on their devices. She explained that the Commission's in-depth investigation would focus on whether, by doing so, Google had breached EU antitrust rules by hindering the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications and services to the detriment of consumers and developers of innovative services and products").
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Europe to accuse Google of illegally abusing its dominance
FT.com, here.
"Ms Vestager on Wednesday will also launch a separate formal investigation into Google’s Android operating system for smartphones.
The Commission probe will examine whether Google imposes uncompetitive terms on handset makers that ultimately favour its own lucrative apps such as YouTube. Google rejects any allegations of wrongdoing and says Android is an open platform distributed free."
"Ms Vestager on Wednesday will also launch a separate formal investigation into Google’s Android operating system for smartphones.
The Commission probe will examine whether Google imposes uncompetitive terms on handset makers that ultimately favour its own lucrative apps such as YouTube. Google rejects any allegations of wrongdoing and says Android is an open platform distributed free."
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Commissioner Vestager announces proposal for e-commerce sector inquiry
Press Release, here.
Only around 15% of European citizens "bought online from a seller based in another EU Member State. This indicates that significant cross-border barriers to e-commerce still exist within the EU. For example, technical barriers, such as geo-blocking, may prevent consumers from accessing certain websites on the basis of their residence or credit-card details".
Only around 15% of European citizens "bought online from a seller based in another EU Member State. This indicates that significant cross-border barriers to e-commerce still exist within the EU. For example, technical barriers, such as geo-blocking, may prevent consumers from accessing certain websites on the basis of their residence or credit-card details".
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Monday, March 23, 2015
The FCC’s Net Neutrality Order Protects Internet Freedom by Restoring the Law
S. Turner and M. Wood, here.
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Saturday, March 21, 2015
Friday, March 20, 2015
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Textbook cartels versus the real deal: Should we be surprised if some cartels do not lead to damage?
F. Maier-Rigaud, C. Milde, M. Helm, here.
Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: The Pros and Cons
Konkurrensverket, Seminar Recap and Presentations here
A Legal and Empirical Study of 3D Printing Online Platforms and an Analysis of User Behaviour
D. Mendis and D. Secchi for the UK IPO, here.
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Monday, March 16, 2015
Friday, March 13, 2015
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
How Much For a Song?: The Antitrust Decrees that Govern the Market for Music
US Senate Hearing, Written Testimonies here.
Kulturpolitische Forderungen für das Urheberrecht im digitalen Umfeld
Bundesregierung.de, Positionspapier hier.
Monday, March 09, 2015
Saturday, March 07, 2015
Friday, March 06, 2015
Thursday, March 05, 2015
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Tuesday, March 03, 2015
Die Sektoruntersuchung des Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel – Ein Kommentar aus ökonomischer Perspektive
J. Haucap,
U. Heimeshoff,
S. Thorwarth,
C. Wey, hier.
Monday, March 02, 2015
Sunday, March 01, 2015
Friday, February 27, 2015
Thursday, February 26, 2015
Why the Print Catalog Is Back in Style
HBR, here.
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
Unentgeldliche TV-Mitschnitte im Schulunterricht und an Universitäten
Petitionsausschuss des deutschen Bundestages, hier.
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
DOJ Is Right About Apple e-Books
WSJ, here (and below).
The Journal mischaracterizes the trial court’s ruling in the Justice Department’s antitrust case against Apple and five e-book publishers (“All Along the Apple Watchtower,” Review & Outlook, Feb. 17). Specifically, you say that the court found that “allowing consumers to read e-books on the iPad was an antitrust conspiracy.” Not so. The case was about agreements on a vital dimension of competition, namely price. It has long been a universally accepted proposition in both law and economics that agreements among competitors to set and regulate prices are anticompetitive. Thus, the court correctly found the agreements illegal. It is no justification that the agreements were intended to wrest control over the pricing of e-books from Amazon, the dominant player in e-book retailing.
Legitimate competition erodes a dominant firm’s position by offering consumers better prices or products. Here consumers received a worse deal. Indeed, the court found that the agreements led to an almost immediate 18% increase in the average price of e-books—hardly a boon to consumer welfare.
You are on more solid ground as regards the activities of the special master appointed to oversee Apple’s compliance with the verdict. (The publishers settled with DOJ before trial.) Even losing antitrust defendants deserve fairness and a reasonable post-verdict opportunity to show good faith efforts to comply with a court order. As you describe, there is ample evidence that this special master has overreached by placing burdens on Apple that are unnecessary to assuring adherence to the final judgment. As you urge, the Second Circuit should sack the special master or at least rein in his powers.
Theodore A. Gebhard
From social media service to advertising network
ICRI/CIR, in close cooperation with iMinds-SMIT, here.
An annotated guide to Facebook's privacy settings (that you've never read)
The Star and D. Fraser, here.
Monday, February 23, 2015
Model contracts for licensing interoperability information
P. Laurent and B. Jean for the European Commission
DG Communications Networks, Content &
Technology, here (pdf download).
C4C Supports the Balanced Approach Taken by MEP Reda and Explains Why
Copyright4creativity.eu, here.
Saturday, February 21, 2015
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