CSIS, here.
"Whereas the European Union positions AI strictly as a human tool and thus perceives a risk in AI evaluating humans, Japan is more accepting of a horizontal relationship between humans and AI" where would you prefer to live?
CSIS, here.
"Whereas the European Union positions AI strictly as a human tool and thus perceives a risk in AI evaluating humans, Japan is more accepting of a horizontal relationship between humans and AI" where would you prefer to live?
Arbeitskreis Kartellrecht, hier.
Bloomberg, here.
OpenAI here ("A US federal court last fall condemned Google’s illegal search monopoly, and will soon issue a decision on how to remediate that long-standing monopoly").
I asked John Sallet about missed remedies and impact on GenAI yesterday at this event
Listen to him at a previous event here,
M. Stoller, here.
On this side of the Atlantic, the CMA: "It is plausible that to the extent Activision content is
added to Game Pass, the price of Game Pass subscriptions may increase
commensurately and therefore the purported benefit from the Merger may not
ultimately accrue to UK consumers to the extent claimed, or even at all" - so: price increase for UK consumers ok, because of added Activision content?
Here.
Teaching material à gogo for your classes, thank you Paolo!
Here.
I'd love to intervene 😊
This is a very basic AI generated video overview produced by Notebook LM - potentially lowering your barriers to entry (these days, experimenting using it with my Students and also with you, dear Wavesblog Readers). The paper offers antitrust folks still reliant on IO economics a different and original lens through which to view things — and that, in itself, is already something decidedly worthwhile!
The Monopoly Report, here.
[Watchers, basically...]
SCIDA, here.
[Disclosure: I submitted an evol econ paper to the conf but it was turned down - it happens, cheer up - soon in ORDO; a very friendly lawyer was kind enough to describe the paper as groundbreaking - sure it isn't but I had fun writing it!]
Eurostack, here.
It's more regulation ;-)
Axios, here.
Big Tech addressing a market failure? What about dual roles?
Reuters, here.
I remember a time when these were the topics discussed in the EU too...
E. Hovenkamp, D. Melamed, here.
Even moderate "traditionalists" are unhappy...
EC, decision here.
Anything in the DMA preventing the EC from being flooded by Apple's waiver requests :-)?
TechCrunch, here.
N.B. "Neither Lovable nor Windsurf have signed a preferred cloud provider agreement"
Why oh why this clarification ;-)?
TechCrunch, here
You had one job. Judge Mehta (actually, three): to fix the online search market.
Financial Express, here.
Course Description
Competition policy has long been regarded as an essential framework for any economy based on market exchange. Its logic is not confined to capitalist systems; rather, it establishes the conditions under which markets can function at all. Traces of such principles can already be discerned in the Roman world two millennia ago, anticipating many features of modern regimes. In recent years, competition has also been valued as a mechanism for stimulating innovation across a wide range of fields, extending far beyond its important role in driving price rivalry.
Unlike other areas of law, there has never been a codified body of international competition law. Yet practice has always carried a strong cross-border dimension. The case of Google in Europe is emblematic: multiple abuses of a dominant position by a U.S. company not only harmed European consumers but also affected European firms, as well as other companies operating within the EU. Many of the latter were themselves U.S. firms.
Traditionally, transatlantic cooperation between the European Union and the United States provided an anchor for international enforcement. These two jurisdictions have also been at the origin of several international initiatives in the field, most notably the creation and promotion of the International Competition Network. The OECD, though a more limited “club” of states, has likewise played an influential role in shaping cross-jurisdictional competition policy.
In recent months, however, the pace of history has accelerated. Established alliances have weakened, autocracies have flourished, and new partnerships among democratic blocs are bound to shape global competition policy in novel ways.
This course begins with a brief historical excursus before moving swiftly to the current order. The beginning of modern legislation in the field of competition policy is usually identified with the enactment of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890, often regarded as the foundational statement of modern antitrust principles. These principles directly influenced the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, which founded the European Economic Community in the late 1950s. Competition was enshrined there into core legal provisions, as it was seen as an important tool to achieve the European single market—a pivotal project, all of which was to be based firmly on the rule of law.
In the closing decades of the twentieth century, competition policy spread widely, with antitrust legislation being adopted in almost every jurisdiction, including China. Yet rather than being strengthened, it often lost force under the prevailing neoliberal ideology. That system rested on a stylised belief that markets tended to function well on their own, requiring only minimal intervention in cases of market failure. The result was a competition policy that became hesitant, overly cautious, and in many respects ineffective.
Today, however, we are entering a post-neoliberal phase. This shift poses new challenges for competition policy, which must be re-imagined and made more effective in order to confront the multiplication of monopolies, particularly in key sectors such as digital technologies and global platforms.
The course will adopt a pragmatic, case-based approach, relying on inductive reasoning rather than abstract theory. From the outset, students will be actively engaged with leading cases and encouraged to draw broader lessons from them. Class sessions will provide ample opportunity for discussion and group work. The material provided will focus on case analysis and critical reflection, always with an eye to the broader context of profound change. What has been done in the past may prove of limited use for the future, and it is precisely this transition that the course aims to address.
Learning Outcomes
By the end of the course, students will be able to:
Assessment
Active participation is both mandatory and strongly encouraged, as it forms an integral part of the final grade. Students will be expected to contribute through presentations and small group assignments conducted throughout the course.
The final examination will be written ("paper and pen") and divided into two parts:
Course Materials and Weekly Assignments
There is no single textbook for this course. Instead, students will receive weekly assignments consisting of readings and case materials. Each class session will build directly on this material, which together forms the required study corpus for the final exam. Weekly study and active participation are therefore not only encouraged but are in themselves the most effective preparation for the assessment.
Bloomberg Law, here.
[The Judge who learned how to code - Oracle v. Google]
FT, here.
Big Tech’s political power has been channelled through the market. By now, we shoud've learned our lesson. AI technologies imposed on consumers and business users are new forms of intermediation. Left to well known dynamics, enshittification is inevitable. US citizens and consumers have no choice, but is it what we want for the EU? Again?Public submissions, here.
EU's pace is utterly inadequate, in these changing times. What to do?
CRAI, here.
No need to worry, everything's just fine. Ask Big Tech and AI conflicted economists!
Luckily, these "studies" are increasingly getting the attention they deserve.
The Eurostack, here.
[Interestingly, straw mannerism has been the preferred tactic also against DMA supporters - plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose]
Mr President,
Perhaps it is all a misunderstanding. Our EU laws are not meant to punish your most prized tech companies, but to secure contestability and fairness in European digital markets. In your own language, it is about levelling the playing field, making markets great again, and ensuring that everyone gets, as you would put it, a fair deal.
In the spirit of cultivating a more balanced understanding in our transatlantic intercourse, we would be delighted to welcome you to our forthcoming conference on the Digital Markets Act, in person or online. There you will hear from independent researchers—a species now sadly endangered in the United States—that the DMA is not contrived to screw your crown jewels, but to build European digital markets on principles rather different from those across the Atlantic, namely firmly rooted in contestability and fairness.
For years we in Europe played the dutiful vassal, scarcely noticing the role, nodding along while our digital industries were subdued and our consumers cheerfully milked. Only recently, as one of our leading thinkers put it, has our faith in this US promoted version of neoliberalism been broken—and here too, Mr President, your role was not negligible. We now see our dependencies and chains—bound to technologies devised elsewhere, with embedded values ofter far from our own.
Thank you for your kind attention. We look forward to your prompt feedback.
Kindest regards
It seems that the antitrust authorities now find themselves caught between hammer and anvil. On the one side, their governments may bow to Trump’s policy line, dismantling digital ex-ante legislation in the process. The clearest cases are South Korea and, quite possibly, India. On the other side comes Draghi, declaring the world order over—with obvious consequences for the international role of independent competition authorities which were established as part of the neoliberal package. Truly, interesting times lie ahead. The EU "adapted" to that age too, as Draghi reminded us (more economic approach, anyone?), but it needs to change again. Quickly.
September 4, 10-11 am Eastern Time, here to sign up.
Belgian competition authority, here.
Center for Journalism and Liberty, here.
DOJ Antitrust Division, here.
And so ends one of the most interesting experiments of Biden-era antitrust, that had begun delivering tangible results for the very American people whom Trump never misses a chance to screw over.From this interesting India ASCOLA webinar, hopefully recording available soon. Why was their DMA "frozen"?
FE, here.
That was soon after South Korea's decision to dump its DMA too. Big Tech in Asia is likely celebrating, with Trump's support. By the way, how effective and influential are independent civil society orgs and academics in those jurisdictions?
More post-mortem (of the Draft Digital Competition Bill) next 13 August, 14.30 CET here.
UK Gov, here.
Reminder: a Labour Government.
D. Coyle, here.
["...if, in the not-too-distant future, my personal AI agent conducts affairs on my behalf with my bank’s AI bot, is that valuable economic activity? How should it be measured in any case?]
Politics Theory Other, Podcast here.
Proton, here.
"When a company chooses an email service, it often uses the entire suite."