Meta 5(2) DMA Non-Compliance Decision

 EC, here.

Urteil des OLG Köln (15 UKl 2/25) bzgl. des Trainings von Meta für ihre KI mit Daten von Facebook und Instagram

 Volltext hier.

A Competition Policy for Cloud and AI

 CERRE, here.

Digital Summit 2025 Gdansk

 Here.

Eine Juristin unter Ökonomen: Heike Schweitzers Wirken im Kronberger Kreis

 Bald hier.

Digital Decade in 2025: progress and outlook

 EC, here.

Antitrust Review Episode 44: In Conversation With Olivier Guersent

 Podcast, here.

[What went wrong, not for him but for competition and the EU consumers ;-)]

The next big power grab in AI? Why Meta’s Scale AI deal must be stopped

 SOMO, here.

The European Way | A Blueprint for Reclaiming Our Digital Future

 Chez Oles, here.

Reorienting Competition Law

 Panel, here.

Technology neutrality in EU digital regulation

 M. Almada, here.

Enshittification on steroids

 So Meta is starting to charge you for WhatsApp, with your data. And alternatives  are limited because of lack  of interoperable choices  of messaging services until now, despite the DMA. In reality, you’re paying for  Meta's AI  efforts that will increasingly manipulate you and, quite likely, kill off  much work altogether. 

Chat with EC’s Daniele Calisti: More room for procompetitive efficiencies?

 Podcast here.

DMA data portability: start thinking beyond closed silos

 OnFabric here.

Two T-Rex walk into a DMA bar...

 From the DMA Team, on the only platform (US, ça va sans dire) they really feel at ease, apparently: here.

My answer to the riddle: "Elementary, Robert! T stands for tyrannos - there can be more than one per CPS..."

Yours? 

Dynamic Competition Operationalized

 NLR, here.

High-Level Debate on Competition, Innovation and Data Protection

 EDPS, Video here.

I’ve watched almost all of it, but in terms of substance it was rather thin. Von der Leyen  I's  data economy strategy is already crumbling underfoot, with  the German industry, closely aligned with her party (and the new German government), poised to give it the final push. The only one you’d buy a used car from is Professor Louisa, but what can she realistically achieve almost single-handedly?

Reupping this because I loved (almost) every word of it: Robin Berjon at re:publica 25

 

Video here. 

Thank you for asking, Robin. This is my short answer but happy to discuss it further.

Concerning the very few words I loved just a bit less: the DMA is not enough, I quite agree, and it was never designed to work in splendid isolation. Competition law against Big Tech has been spectacularly ineffective, which rather invites the awkward question of whether it is even fundamentally capable of addressing the abusive exercise of economic power at all. Still, one could hope for reform, couldn’t one? That was the idea not so long ago. Now? Well, let’s say prospects are somewhat clouded: too much capture (and not just from the usual suspects: nostalgic lawyers clinging to familiar doctrines and IO economists with a keen eye for consulting fees aren’t exactly accelerating progress).
That said, change is seeping through, almost discreetly, from within the DMA’s own machinery: adjust your business model if necessary; unable to provide interoperability? We’ll happily spell it out for you; anti-steering? Surely you jest. And more will follow. Even judges seem to be taking notice, as the Auto Android ruling suggests.
Change is happening, slowly, admittedly, and perhaps depressingly so, given how history has picked up the pace of late. But still: this is democracy at work. And in the present political climate, it would be remiss not to say so.

We All Suffer from OpenAI’s Pursuit of Scale

 K. Hao, here. 

Bundeskartellamt hat Bußgelder gegen Sennheiser Sonova wegen vertikaler Preisbindung beim Vertrieb von „Premium-Kopfhörern“ verhängt (Entscheidung vom 16. April 2025).

 Fallbericht, hier. 

Highlighting Litigation Success in the Digital Rights Community

 Digital Freedom Fund, here.

So baut man ein nachhaltiges Open Source Unternehmen

 Re:publica 25, hier.

Souverän aus Deutschland: Ionos und Nextcloud entwickeln M365-Alternative

 Heise.de, hier.

Big Tech: litigar en México!

 Aquì. 

Now AI tools are being imposed on us, and we even get to pay for the privilege (either with our data or with our money), whether we want them or not. What can be done?

Obviously, I don’t have the answer. If you're waiting for antitrust to step in (is it exploitative behaviour? bundling? is there "choice"? what’s the relevant market?), see you in 10 years, perhaps. What about data protection authorities? What happened with Meta's legitimate interest push to swallow up our data is frustrating to say the least (fully agree with Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider ).

The example of Wikipedia editors pushing back against AI generated summaries is instead encouraging. As part of effective regulatory frameworks, we need to devise ways for AI-affected people/humans to express their voice, mechanisms we can’t even fully envisage yet, both at the public institutional level (learnings from the Dutch scandal?) and in private institutions (Mitrechtsomething) or market settings (UI, choices, data portability, etc.).

The Most Infallible Panelist for your next AI/Antitrust Conference

 

Politico.eu, here. 

What Abundance Gets Wrong

 The Capitol, Video here. 

 

The Storm Clouds Looming Past the State Moratorium: Weak Regulation is as Bad as None

AI Now, here.  

Anyone looking into the Meta/Scale AI Deal? Can you imagine if...

 CNBS, here.

Brazil's top court votes to hold social media platforms accountable for user posts

 Reuters, here. 

A Manel for Heike Schweitzer

 

From LinkedIn, here. 

"Die Stiftung Marktwirtschaft gedenkt heute an die vor einem Jahr verstorbene Wettbewerbsjuristin Heike Schweitzer. Nach einer Einführung von Michael Eilfort ins Thema „Wettbewerb als geniales Entmachtungsinstrument“ moderiert die Wirtschaftsjournalistin Ursula Weidenfeld die Veranstaltung und Diskussion im Fraktionssaal der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion im Deutscher Bundestag.

Vielen Dank für die vielen guten Impulse!

Andreas Mundt vom Bundeskartellamt ist überzeugt, dass man den hashtag#Wettbewerb mit mutigen Schritten verteidigen sollte. Die Klage gegen hashtag#Facebook habe 19a GWB zur Folge gehabt, welcher seine Wirkung bereits segensreich entfaltet habe. Dieser dürfe nicht geändert werden. Seine aktuelle Erfahrung mit der Trump-Administration lässt ihn sicher sein, dass man auch dort auf fachlicher Ebene trotz allem gegen wettbewerbsschädliches Verhalten der hashtag#BigTech-Unternehmen weiter vorgehen wolle.

Johannes Laitenberger vom Court of Justice of the European Union macht deutlich, dass das hashtag#Wettbewerbsrecht „als geniales Entmachtungsinstrument“ (Franz Böhm, Wegbereiter der sozialen Marktwirtschaft) häufig vorzuziehen sei vor neuer Regulierung (außer z.B. bei den sog. Torwächtern iSd hashtag#DigitalMarketAct). Der deutsche hashtag#Ordoliberalismus sei von der heute gewürdigten Heike Schweitzer erfolgreich auch nach hashtag#Europa getragen worden.

Lars Feld vom Walter Eucken Institut: Wettbewerb sei ein Entdeckungsverfahren für hashtag#Innovationen. Die Privatrechtsordnung müsse im Umfeld digitaler Machtkonzentrationen angepasst werden. Wettbewerb benötige eine friedliche Weltordnung, die es aktuell nicht mehr so gäbe, dass positive Werte im Privatrecht geschaffen werden können, weil Regierungen zu protektionistisch und dirigistisch seien. Eine Umkehr dieser aktuellen hashtag#Wettbewerbspolitik sei dringend geboten.

Josef Drexl vom Max Planck Institute: Heike Schweitzer habe zu Recht darauf hingewiesen, dass solche Unternehmen, die Marktplätze betreiben, als Hüter dieser Infrastruktur im Sinne des Ordoliberalismus besser reguliert werden müssten, damit der Wettbewerb nicht eingeschränkt wird. In bestimmten Bereichen (wie der Klimapolitik) reiche es auch nicht mehr aus, Innovationen freien Lauf zu lassen. Vielmehr müssten bestimmte Vorgaben gemacht werden (z.B. Entkarbonisierung), die Innovationen sollten diesen Vorgaben folgend entwickelt werden.

Justus Haucap vom Düsseldorfer Institut für Wettbewerbsökonomie: Allein auf den Wettbewerb zu setzen, würde nicht alle Probleme lösen, gerade nicht in Branchen mit Monopolen etc., wie im digitalen Bereich.

Thorsten Käseberg vom Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy: Würde gerne mit Heike Schweitzer heute über die hashtag#Machtkonzentration bei KI-Unternehmen sprechen. Horizontale hashtag#Industrieregulierung wie etwa hashtag#Entbürokratisierung sei auch wichtig für einen ordentlichen Wettbewerb.

Auch der Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband setzt sich für einen funktionierenden Wettbewerb und eine verbraucherfreundliche Regulierung ein" 

PS: I obviously agree that competition can be a brilliant instrument for Entmachtung. But in some contexts, brilliant monopolists have managed either to disable it or to steer it entirely in their own interest (“ecosystem”). For instance, keeping competition alive in the AI era may end up resembling the artificial life support of a terminal patient. 

New Apple Games App: Guaranteed Un-Installable in the EU

Apple has announced that its new Games app will be preinstalled on everyone’s home screen with iOS 26 and iPadOS 26. For those rightly concerned about the extent to which the DMA is future-proof, there is some reassurance: under the DMA, this app will need to be uninstallable in the EU. The Commission has only recently closed a non-compliance proceeding against Apple, after the company brought itself into compliance by making numerous previously non-removable apps uninstallable. It is therefore highly unlikely that Apple will attempt to test the DMA boundaries again with the Games app. Right? 

Fediverse explained in 4 minutes

 E. Rossini, here. 

Data Portability Revisited: Toward the Human-Centric, AI-Driven Data Ecosystems of Tomorrow

 M. Fenwick et al., here. 

“Localhost tracking” explained. It could cost Meta 32 billion.

 Zero Party Data, here. 

Understanding Consumer Use of Generative AI

 For DRCF, here.

A Ladder of Investment to Competition for Online Search Services

 T. Hoppner, S. Uphues, here.

News Sites Are Getting Crushed by Google’s New AI Tools

 WSJ, here. 

The Pros and Cons of Industrial Policy

 Video here.

Biting into better interoperability? First thoughts on Apple 6(7) specification decision regarding "process" (with a coda on the other specification decision)

Disclosure: for 7 months covering Maria Luisa (Isa) Stasi’s leave, I had the honour of working with Article 19 and contributed to a civil society’s joint submission for the public consultation on this very decision. Once Isa returned (January 2025) I resumed my full-time research activities. That said, mine will be a fresh look: no hard feelings towards the Commission for having paid rather selctive attention to the observations submitted.

There is much to unpack. Decision here. 

The first thing to note is that the decision is limited to specifying Apple’s implementation measures with respect to the process for requesting interoperability concerning existing iOS/iPadOS features. This is a form of guidance that Apple would, by all appearances, have gladly done without, but which the EU co-legislators expressly provided for in Article 8(2) of the DMA. The DMA sets a strict deadline: the implementing act specifying the measures must be adopted within six months of the opening of proceedings. This timing is absolutely essential to prevent the process from becoming a strategy for deferring compliance ad Kalendas Graecas. Much like those in civil society, though without taking into account the stark inequality of resources, Apple was required to respond promptly, and to sacrifice part of its Christmas holidays to the case.

Now imagine, dear Wavesblog Reader, that you’re an app developer (yes, the one from the painting) who relies on  iOS/iPadOS to access your users, reading and trying to make sense of the scope of Article 6(7) of the DMA, just as the Commission does, at some length, across 54 paragraphs (41 to 95). Each of the now numerous DMA commentaries will, in future, inevitably have to begin with this detailed analysis, on which judges, too, will soon be called to rule. 

The unquestionable starting point is that Article 6(7) refers to the “same hardware and software features” as are available or used by the gatekeeper’s services or hardware. Thus, same feature (the what) and  “equally effective interoperability” (the how) in terms of both the effectiveness of the interoperability solution and the conditions under which that solution is made available to you, "by comparison to how the gatekeeper implements interoperability and access to hardware and software features for its own services and hardware".  Among the properties of the feature itself that you might care particularly about, the Commission lists by way of example the end user journey, ease of use, device and software set-up, data transmission speed, and energy consumption. According to the Commission, the EU legislator recognised that while the feature must be the same for both you and Apple (e.g., data transmission speed), the implementation of interoperability, though not necessarily identical, must be equally effective to that enjoyed by Apple. Clearly, an implementation of this obligation that grants you only a degraded feature (for instance, slower data transmission than that enjoyed by Apple), cannot be considered compliant with Article 6(7), whose purpose is to allow you to offer your services and hardware, and to innovate, “on an equal footing with the gatekeeper.” Contestability and fairness, those Castor and Pollux of the DMA temple, must be duly honoured. 

Apple was required to comply with Article 6(7), as well as the others DMA obligations, as of 7 March 2024. This, evidently, has not occurred as envisaged, as you, dear app developer, may well have noticed. Nor has it escaped the Commission, which has been closely monitoring the situation, issuing a string of RFIs along the way. Perhaps you received one yourself, an RFI from the Commission asking, for instance, about your experience filing one of the interoperability requests with Apple after DMA compliance date , or about the difficulties you faced in trying to identify the features Apple uses for its own services and hardware.To deal with this situation, in addition to the possibility of finding a plain vanilla infringement, the EU legislator has introduced an entirely novel instrument: the specification proceeding. Article 8 of the DMA confers upon the Commission the power to unilaterally determine the specific measures required for compliance, distinguishing the specification process from a commitment procedure, which is centred on making the company’s own proposals binding.

This also means that, in empowering the Commission to specify the measures necessary to ensure effective compliance with the legislative provisions, the EU legislator made clear that the Commission is under no obligation to adhere to the gatekeeper’s own, inevitably self-serving, interpretation of its compliance duties. Apple’s first (2024) and the second (2025) compliance reports stated, in concrete terms, what it considered to be the most favourable interpretation of Article 6(7): an approach based on request-based interoperability. As regards solely the features existing on the date of adoption of its  decision, the Commission considers that such an interoperability request-based process may be deemed compliant with the DMA, provided the conditions laid down in its Decision are fully met. As for new features released after the adoption of the Decision, Apple is expected to adopt by default a proactive approach to compliance and interoperability by design, as envisaged in Recital 65 of the DMA. The decision, in what is referred to as an Annex, sets out the specific measures Apple is required to implement, along with the corresponding timelines. Within two years, the Commission will assess the effectiveness and impact of these measures. Moreover, with regard to new features, excluded from the scope of the current specification, the Commission will take into account the compliance actions taken by Apple in determining whether its approach aligns with the proactive, interoperability-by-design standard foreseen in the DMA (see Article 1). 

Much could be debated as to whether the request-based process specified and prescribed by the Commission might have been further improved, and here I note once again (see disclosure) that civil society, developers, and researchers had put forward constructive suggestions, only partially reflected in the final outcome. What now most draws my researcher's initial attention, and would warrant deeper reflection beyond this blog post, is the exchange, clearly emerging from the decision, between the Commission and Apple over the meaning and practical implications of the interoperability by design obligation. Compliance by design under the DMA had already caught my attention nearly two years ago, in what now feels like the prehistory of DMA enforcement. 

In paragraph 104 of the Decision, the Commission recalls that gatekeepers should ensure compliance with Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 "by design and free of charge." This formulation encapsulates two core aspects of the provision. First, interoperability must not be treated as an afterthought or a concession granted upon pressing request, but built into the architecture of the regulated operating systems at the outset. Second, a system that imposes high transaction costs on developers to obtain interoperability can hardly be described as free of charge. In fact, this is not confined to the absence of explicit fees; it extends to ensuring that access is not undermined by burdensome procedures, opaque criteria, built-in friction, unjustified delays, etc. But then, quite justifiably, you may ask yourself, dear developer: how can the principle of interoperability by design possibly be reconciled with Apple's request-based process endorsed and further disciplined by the Commission? After all, if interoperability must be embedded by design, shouldn’t it be somewhat automatic, largely transparent, and proactively enabled, rather than contingent on your ability to navigate a request system, identify shadowy features, and patiently wait for the gatekeeper’s response?

 You may find some reassurance in reading paragraph 105, which suggests that the Commission may, in fact, share many of your views and concerns. It is worth quoting in full:

"Unlike proactive approaches such as interoperability by design, a request-based system presents important limitations and difficulties for third parties. In particular, it causes delays due to the need to process requests and implement solutions, and it leads to associated transaction costs. It requires third parties to (attempt to) recognise the hardware and software features that may be available to or used by the gatekeeper. It may also necessitate the disclosure of third parties’ confidential information to the gatekeeper. Moreover, it risks enabling the gatekeeper to maintain control over the request-based process and its outcome (i.e. whether, when and how interoperability will be provided), in a context where the gatekeeper may have incentives to refuse, delay, or restrict the provision of interoperability to competitors or potential competitors. Overall, in a context characterised by information asymmetry and imbalance in bargaining power, a request-based process may allow the gatekeeper to undermine the effectiveness of Article 6(7) of Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, and the ability of third parties to innovate." 

Nonetheless, the request-based approach adopted by Apple is endorsed by the Commission, albeit subject to the (substantial) adjustments set out in Annex I. Why? Apple, the Commission notes in paragraph 107, had not envisaged third party interoperability in the original design of the operating system and/or of the features prior to the entry into force of Article 6(7). Faced with this legacy design, the Commission appears to have accepted that a request-based mechanism could serve as a somewhat transitional form of compliance, provided it fully complies with all the conditions set out in Annex I. Subject to the conditions it lays down, the Commission considers that it has addressed the risks previously identified in the rather long paragraph quoted above, and thereby ensured the “respect of third parties’ right to interoperability” (para. 107). 

While the Commission confirms that, with regard to existing features, there is no obligation of interoperability by design, it nevertheless notes that the measures specified in the Decision make compliance with Article 6(7) “more automatic” and, in this sense, provide a “pathway” towards interoperability by design. Instead, when it comes to new features, the Commission makes clear that interoperability by design should be persued by Apple (para. 110). 

If, however, we turn to interoperability concerning specific features related to connected physical devices, the situation looks entirely different. For any feature covered by "the other" Article 6(7) specification decision, the request-based process is bypassed altogether: Apple is required to implement the prescribed substantive measures within the timeframes set out by the Commission. Some of these features, the Commission notes, could already be included in the forthcoming iOS 19, currently being unveiled by Apple as I write. Connected physical devices range from payment cards to cars, insofar as they either transmit or receive data. Interoperability with regard to connected physical devices is of substantial economic importance. As Apple itself acknowledges, "most iOS devices do—at some point—connect to a physical device within the EU." What the Commission does in this second Decision is provide Apple with detailed guidance, spelling out the exact interoperability solutions required for specific features, aspects of their technical implementation, and the modalities of access that must be made available to third parties.  

At this point, the relationship between the two Decisions, and indeed the overall picture, becomes more intelligible: under the DMA, effective interoperability is understood as something that develops over time, evolving alongside, indeed, accompanying, technological change. To take this obligation seriously dans la longue durée, Apple must first establish a meaningful channel of communication and cooperation with developers requesting interoperability. The Commission considers that, if properly implemented with the safeguards it has specified, even a request-based system can serve this function. In such a framework, developers may articulate specific interoperability needs which Apple is then required to meet. Should Apple fail to do so in accordance with the DMA, the Commission may subsequently intervene, either through a further specification decision or, where appropriate, by initiating an infringement procedure. In this sense, the request-based system outlines a pathway toward interoperability by design, one in which, over time, it should make little sense for Apple to maintain separate interoperability solutions: one for its own products and services, and another for third parties.

In the case of the connectivity features covered by the second Decision, however, concerns about the lack of effective interoperability have already materialised. These are “borne out in requests made by third parties via Apple’s Interoperability Request Portal and submissions during the administrative proceedings and the public consultation,” as well as “by Apple’s submissions outlining possible interoperability solutions and its proposed implementation deadlines” (para. 18). The purpose of the second specification decision is therefore “to swiftly provide effective interoperability solutions to the market” (para. 19), and in the event of any conflict, it prevails over the process decision (para.20) (on this last point, a legal mind cannot help but glimpse vast and fertile fields for further musings). 

These are merely initial reflections, but one must concede that the future of interoperability in the EU, as it is now taking shape, is both stimulating and encouraging. You, dear Developer, in the EU and beyond, so long as you serve EU users, should be a little more hopeful than before. This is at any rate true for someone who has long followed the subject from a competition policy perspective, and who can only welcome the emergence of promising developments not only under the DMA, but even on the more traditional front governed by the stricter contours of Article 102.There will be ample opportunity to write more on this, and I very much look forward to discussing it further during an upcoming webinar, one that will also bring in perspectives and experiences from other jurisdictions.

Artificial Power: 2025 Landscape Report

 AINOW, here. 

Rechtsgutachten: Unzulässigkeit der Verarbeitung von Social-Media- Daten für KI-Training durch Meta

 Simpliant, hier.

Case DMA.100204 – Article 6(7) – Apple iOS and iPadOS – SP - Process

 Here. 

DMA.200203 - Article 6(7) – Apple – iOS – SP – Features for Connected Physical Devices

 EC, here. 

An International Digital Strategy for the European Union

 EC, K. Kallas, here. 

Reading the Tea Leaves: Closing Arguments in Google’s Search Remedies Trial

 S. Sharma, here. 

Musk’s X Aims to Soothe EU Regulators [aka finally might start complying with the DSA] With Blue Check Disclaimer

 Bloomberg, here. 

Scaling up European innovation: What is the potential European added value of a 28th regime?

 EPRS, here. 

CPDP 2025 - Future of social media: what’s the recipe for pluralism, long-term user value and safety in recommender systems?

 

Video here. 

CPDP.ai 2025 - Innovation beyond Big Tech

 Video, here. 

NYC Book Launch: Empire of AI

 Video, here. 

Participation of third parties in the public enforcement of the Digital Markets Act: between democracy and technocracy

 K. Cseres, L. de Korte, here. 

Big Tech’s AI Endgame Is Coming Into Focus

  The Atlantic, here. 

Faustian Pact for unlimited BS

The BS Machine (trained on our data and IP - without our permission)

 

Sounding much like your favourite CEO

A. Guinzburg, here. 

Bundeskartellamt has concerns about Amazon’s use of so-called price control mechanisms

 Here.

How tech broligarchs are trying to build an authoritarian surveillance state using AI and your data

 Chez Jon, here. 

Digital Platform Regulation: Making Markets Work for People

 F. Scott Morton, here.

[Most of them, previously published Bruegel policy papers you might have read already]. 

PRIVACY WITHOUT PAYING: ALTERNATIVES TO META’S SURVEILLANCE ADVERTISING MODELS

 Open Rights Group, here. 

Commission fines Delivery Hero and Glovo €329 million for participation in online food delivery cartel

 Press Release, here. 

Do you think that technology should work well with democracy?

 R. Berjon, here. 

Apparently only the Digital Markets Act can stop Bing from begging you to switch

 The Verge, here. 

EU Digital Economy:general framework (DSA/DMA)and specialised regime

 FIDE 2025, here. 

Big Tech monopoly maintenance: Is a ‘go and sin no more’ remedy sufficient?

 The TechTank Podcast, here. 

Meta AI: Für die Daten die schon drin sind, ein bisschen zu spät ("unfassbar")

 Re:publica, hier. 

Trends – Artificial Intelligence (AI)

 Bond, here.