From THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PATENT POLICY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: "For the federal antitrust agencies, the extension of patent monopolies in time through profuse improvement patenting and their extension in scope through restrictive cross-licensing agreements pose important enforcement problems. Here too, the problem is in part one of education. Those who manage the antitrust agencies need to learn that there are important barriers to rapid imitation, enhancing incentives for innovation, other than the patent system, so maximization of monopoly rewards associated with patent holdings is unlikely to maximize economic welfare. These agencies need to learn that extension of patent monopolies over time and in scope is more likely to suppress than stimulate innovation. and insisting that drug production be opened up for generic competition once basic patents have expired, leaving however the right to produce validly patented improvement molecules exclusively in the hands of the original drug developer (or any other firm that patents and tests improved variants)"
Friday, August 28, 2009
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Podcast, here .
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Euractiv, here. While some influential US/EU academics want us to largely forget the DMA and go back to a revised 102 😔.
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Computerworld, here .
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Au sujet des critères qui guident l’appréciation des effets des clauses d’exclusivité, le Conseil dans sa décision a considérés comme décisi...
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Slaughter & May, here .
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Smh.com.au, here .
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Pressemeldung, hier .
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Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, Ordonnance de référé du 16 septembre 2014, ici .
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