Consumerwatchdog.org, here.
Friday, May 08, 2015
Thursday, May 07, 2015
Le Groupement National des Indépendants (GNI) gagne contre Expedia
Hotellerie.de, ici.
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
CA Supreme Court on pay for delay
Cipro I & II, here.
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
Rival music services say Apple's App Store pricing is anticompetitive
TheVerge, here.
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
Egalité d'accès de tous les professionnels aux réservations du refuge du Goûter (Mont Blanc)
Autorité de la concurrence, ici.
(Un grand bravo à l'Autorité, mais elle a encore du boulot, dans la vallée de Chamonix - un monopole skiable).
(Un grand bravo à l'Autorité, mais elle a encore du boulot, dans la vallée de Chamonix - un monopole skiable).
Wednesday, May 06, 2015
Entente dans le secteur de la commercialisation de la viande de volaille (poulet, dinde, canard, lapin, etc.)
Autorité de la concurrence, ici. Décision ici.
"En raison des circonstances très particulières de cette affaire, l'Autorité a considéré que l'engagement collectif de mettre en place une interprofession dans un calendrier contraint, pris par des industriels représentant l'essentiel du marché est susceptible d'avoir, pour le respect durable des règles de la concurrence dans le secteur de la viande de volaille, une plus grande efficacité que des sanctions pécuniaires calculées selon la méthode habituelle."
A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe
EC, here.
"The Commission will...comprehensively analyse the role of online platforms (search engines, social media, app stores, etc.) in the market. This will cover issues such as the non-transparency of search results and of pricing policies, how they use the information they acquire, relationships between platforms and suppliers and the promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors – to the extent these are not already covered by competition law. It will also look into how to best tackle illegal content on the Internet."
Staff working paper here.
"The accumulation and use of data by certain market players can contribute to their market power, in particular in their relationship with the data suppliers", p. 53.
"Some platforms act as a marketplace and a retailer at the same time. These platforms may use the transactional data acquired from business users of the marketplace segment to enhance the performance of the platform's retail arm. This can lead to discrimination in listing between platforms' own services and third party services. Companies may also complain that they do not get access to the data collected through transactions linked to their "products", p. 55.
"some platforms simply forbid companies from selling more cheaply elsewhere (including the seller's own website, other platforms and all offline distribution channels). The issue has already been examined by various competition authorities", id.
"Given the dynamics of the markets created and served by platforms, and the relatively short time that they have been in existence, more work is needed to gather comprehensive and reliable evidence on how different types of platform work and their effects on their customers and the economy as a whole. On the basis of such an evidence base, an assessment can be made of the nature of the problems that may arise from their pivotal role in the digital economy and whether existing regulatory tools are sufficient to tackle them, or whether new tools need to be developed" id.
"The Commission will...comprehensively analyse the role of online platforms (search engines, social media, app stores, etc.) in the market. This will cover issues such as the non-transparency of search results and of pricing policies, how they use the information they acquire, relationships between platforms and suppliers and the promotion of their own services to the disadvantage of competitors – to the extent these are not already covered by competition law. It will also look into how to best tackle illegal content on the Internet."
Staff working paper here.
"The accumulation and use of data by certain market players can contribute to their market power, in particular in their relationship with the data suppliers", p. 53.
"Some platforms act as a marketplace and a retailer at the same time. These platforms may use the transactional data acquired from business users of the marketplace segment to enhance the performance of the platform's retail arm. This can lead to discrimination in listing between platforms' own services and third party services. Companies may also complain that they do not get access to the data collected through transactions linked to their "products", p. 55.
"some platforms simply forbid companies from selling more cheaply elsewhere (including the seller's own website, other platforms and all offline distribution channels). The issue has already been examined by various competition authorities", id.
"Given the dynamics of the markets created and served by platforms, and the relatively short time that they have been in existence, more work is needed to gather comprehensive and reliable evidence on how different types of platform work and their effects on their customers and the economy as a whole. On the basis of such an evidence base, an assessment can be made of the nature of the problems that may arise from their pivotal role in the digital economy and whether existing regulatory tools are sufficient to tackle them, or whether new tools need to be developed" id.
Tuesday, May 05, 2015
Friday, May 01, 2015
Thursday, April 30, 2015
Brussels to probe online search listings
FT, here.
"Brussels will this year launch a probe into online platforms such as Amazon and Google examining the way they list search results and how they use customer data...The investigation will look at the role of paid for links and advertisements in search results, along with the ability of individuals and businesses to move from platform to platform"
"Brussels will this year launch a probe into online platforms such as Amazon and Google examining the way they list search results and how they use customer data...The investigation will look at the role of paid for links and advertisements in search results, along with the ability of individuals and businesses to move from platform to platform"
Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Tuesday, April 28, 2015
Across Platform Parity Agreements (APPAs): CMA Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation
A. Crisholm, Presentation here (download).
Friday, April 24, 2015
Invention as a combinatorial process: evidence from US patents
H.Youn, D. Strumsky, L. Bettencourt, J. Lobo, here.
Intellectual Property and Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry
AGCM, Conference presentations available here.
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
Homo economicus and Homo sapiens: The CMA experience of behavioural economics
D. Currie, here.
(Terrific read - and compulsory for the students attending my upcoming Fall Antitrust Course)
(Terrific read - and compulsory for the students attending my upcoming Fall Antitrust Course)
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
Friday, April 17, 2015
Thursday, April 16, 2015
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
EU Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service; opens separate formal investigation on Android
Press Release, here.
Commissioner Vestager's statement here.
Minutes of the meeting of the Commission here (on Android: "She pointed out that Google had led development of the Android mobile operating system since 2005, and the majority of smartphone and tablet manufacturers used this system, having concluded agreements with Google to obtain the right to install Google's applications on their devices. She explained that the Commission's in-depth investigation would focus on whether, by doing so, Google had breached EU antitrust rules by hindering the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications and services to the detriment of consumers and developers of innovative services and products").
Commissioner Vestager's statement here.
Minutes of the meeting of the Commission here (on Android: "She pointed out that Google had led development of the Android mobile operating system since 2005, and the majority of smartphone and tablet manufacturers used this system, having concluded agreements with Google to obtain the right to install Google's applications on their devices. She explained that the Commission's in-depth investigation would focus on whether, by doing so, Google had breached EU antitrust rules by hindering the development and market access of rival mobile operating systems, applications and services to the detriment of consumers and developers of innovative services and products").
Tuesday, April 14, 2015
Europe to accuse Google of illegally abusing its dominance
FT.com, here.
"Ms Vestager on Wednesday will also launch a separate formal investigation into Google’s Android operating system for smartphones.
The Commission probe will examine whether Google imposes uncompetitive terms on handset makers that ultimately favour its own lucrative apps such as YouTube. Google rejects any allegations of wrongdoing and says Android is an open platform distributed free."
"Ms Vestager on Wednesday will also launch a separate formal investigation into Google’s Android operating system for smartphones.
The Commission probe will examine whether Google imposes uncompetitive terms on handset makers that ultimately favour its own lucrative apps such as YouTube. Google rejects any allegations of wrongdoing and says Android is an open platform distributed free."
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Commissioner Vestager announces proposal for e-commerce sector inquiry
Press Release, here.
Only around 15% of European citizens "bought online from a seller based in another EU Member State. This indicates that significant cross-border barriers to e-commerce still exist within the EU. For example, technical barriers, such as geo-blocking, may prevent consumers from accessing certain websites on the basis of their residence or credit-card details".
Only around 15% of European citizens "bought online from a seller based in another EU Member State. This indicates that significant cross-border barriers to e-commerce still exist within the EU. For example, technical barriers, such as geo-blocking, may prevent consumers from accessing certain websites on the basis of their residence or credit-card details".
Wednesday, March 25, 2015
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Monday, March 23, 2015
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Saturday, March 21, 2015
Friday, March 20, 2015
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: The Pros and Cons
Konkurrensverket, Seminar Recap and Presentations here
A Legal and Empirical Study of 3D Printing Online Platforms and an Analysis of User Behaviour
D. Mendis and D. Secchi for the UK IPO, here.
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Monday, March 16, 2015
Friday, March 13, 2015
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
Kulturpolitische Forderungen für das Urheberrecht im digitalen Umfeld
Bundesregierung.de, Positionspapier hier.
Monday, March 09, 2015
Saturday, March 07, 2015
Friday, March 06, 2015
Thursday, March 05, 2015
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Tuesday, March 03, 2015
Die Sektoruntersuchung des Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel – Ein Kommentar aus ökonomischer Perspektive
J. Haucap,
U. Heimeshoff,
S. Thorwarth,
C. Wey, hier.
Monday, March 02, 2015
Sunday, March 01, 2015
Friday, February 27, 2015
Thursday, February 26, 2015
Why the Print Catalog Is Back in Style
HBR, here.
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
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Centre for a Digital Society , Video here . These are my very rough talking points on pay or okay in full length (more than I actually had...
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Report to the California Law Review Commission Antitrust Law: Study B-750, here .
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A. Blankertz, hier .
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CMA, here .
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Organized Money, here .
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InternetLab, here .
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Chalmermagne, here .