Friday, June 25, 2010
Settlement In DRAM Case
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Viacom v Google on the Interpretation of DMCA "safe harbor" provision
are infringements (here, claimed to be widespread and common), or rather mean actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual items".
According to the judge, "if a service provider knows (from notice from the owner, or a “red flag”) of specific instances of infringement, the provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the infringement. General knowledge that infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements."
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
Competition and agriculture: potential competition concerns with respect to the breeding and commercialisation of sunflower seeds and sunflower seed treatment products in Europe?
Monday, June 21, 2010
WIPO SSCR/20: More on Limitations and Exceptions
US' declaration at SSCR/20: need to keep an holistic approach on L&E; need to move forward swiftly. US' draft consensus instrument as initial step.
In the meanwhile, the US distributed a Background Paper and FAQs (submitted as an information document) on the proposed consensus instrument.
See a comparison of the four proposals presently being discussed (limited to aspects concerning persons with disabilities, the "African Proposal" covers further matters). The wording of the Conclusions was so controversial, that no agreement could be reached. As the WIPO bravely puts it, "(D)uring a late night discussion, agreed language for final conclusions proved elusive. Member states had divergent views on the wording for future work on the scope of an international instrument relating to exceptions and limitations, and on whether and when informal consultations should take place on the protection of broadcasting organizations. Discussion on all these issues will continue at the next session of the SCCR from November 8 to 12, 2010."
Berliner Rede zum Urheberrecht
Saturday, June 19, 2010
How the Federal Trade Commission Works to Promote Competition and Benefit Consumers in a Dynamic Economy
Friday, June 18, 2010
Thursday, June 17, 2010
UNESCO on Fighting Piracy with Non-Legislative Measures
COUNTERACT IT, Luis Villarroel (Corporacion Innovarte).
South Africa: Beyond Competition on the Pitch
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
Recent Developments in EU Merger Control
Monday, June 14, 2010
More on Behavioral Antitrust
EGEDA: tarifas abusivas en concepto del derecho exclusivo de autorizar la comunicación pública?
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Wednesday, June 09, 2010
Three-Strike in practice
Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: "Some" Economists' Comment
Tuesday, June 08, 2010
Monday, June 07, 2010
Friday, June 04, 2010
Swedish Competition Authority: Ex-Post Agency Effectiveness Evaluation
Thursday, June 03, 2010
Trento's "Festival of Economics"
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
Remedies in the EU Microsoft Case
Tuesday, June 01, 2010
WIPO SCCR/19: the draft report is out
Reflecting on the best antitrust regime: a view from the US
Monday, May 31, 2010
Apple's App Store and GPL
Friday, May 28, 2010
Revised competition rules for motor vehicle distribution and repair in the EU
On the United/Continental Airlines Merger
Discussing the Goals of Competition Law
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Tuesday, May 25, 2010
Sunday, May 23, 2010
Friday, May 21, 2010
Intellectual Property Regimes in a Global Context
Winston Tabb (convener), Nancy Weiss and Michael Geist, Proceedings of the 156th Association of Research Libraries Membership Meeting.
Joaquin Almunia on the first European Commission Cartel Settlement
Thursday, May 20, 2010
On Banks and Competition Policy
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Jane Ginsburg on Mandatory Copyright Formalities
DRAM producers fined € 331 million for price cartel
Tuesday, May 18, 2010
Filmmakers and the use of fair dealing in Canada
Strategies for opening up content
Monday, May 17, 2010
On Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
Behavioral Antitrust, A. P. Reeves, M. E. Stucke. See also OFT's What does Behavioural Economics mean for Competition Policy?
Friday, May 14, 2010
DRM in motion
EPO on computer-implemented inventions
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
India-EU Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement - IPR Chapter
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
On the concept of ‘fair compensation’ in the InfoSoc directive
Some highlights from the WIPO Symposium on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy
- trying to bring together two communities (ipr experts/competition experts; national competition authorities/national ip offices)
- ipr-competition not antagonistic
- well-balanced ip also very important
-- outcome envisaged: no formal conclusions or recommendations
-- new division on ip/competition established
-- technical assistance (already requested by Syria)
- iprs are not monopolies, they are not a "necessary evil" but, and foremostly, a differentiation/identification tool (i.e. not only about creations and inventions)
-- insofar, at the very core of competition and rivarly,
-- not easy; necessary trials and errors, institutional/legal experiments, picking out the efficient solutions
- difference between an abuse of ip that results into anticompetitive effects and another which does not (reference to a case concerning a patent for irradiating food stuff increasing its vitamin c content and the legal issues thereof involving the important principle of access to health)
- TRIPs allows for a certain freedom in this area, but countries very often are not using it
-- but TRIPs leaves some questions unanswered (e.g., evaluative standards to anticompetitivess)
-- WIPO, WTO, OECD should provide some more help in this respect
-- collective guidelines could be helpful, based on enforcement experience, study and reflection
-- well designed ip systems already address (most) competition concerns internally (i.e., patentability criteria)
- TRIPs, articles 40, 31, 31.k, 8.2
-- art. 40.2 permissive rather than prescriptive (list non-exhaustive)
-- art. 31 (compulsory licences)
--- detailed conditions
--- protecting the legitimate interest of the right holder
-- art. 31.k (competition policy "shortcut"): "...use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive"
--- unanswered question:decision taken by the head of a national competition authority is an "administrative process"?
- clash of remedies possible
-- e.g. Microsoft
--- compulsory licence in the EU, "leak" across other jurisdictions
---- before deciding on remedies, possible repercussions should be carefully investigated
-- clusters of blocking patents
-- standards-reinforced patents
-- gene patents
-- grantbacks, but depending on circumstances
-- conflicts likely to be increasingly significant, also at the remedies level
--- NCAs likely to oppose "hard" convergence
- Recommendation 40 ("To request WIPO to intensify its cooperation on IP related issues with United Nations agencies, according to Member States’ orientation, in particular UNCTAD, UNEP, WHO, UNIDO, UNESCO and other relevant international organizations, especially the WTO in order to strengthen the coordination for maximum efficiency in undertaking development programs")
- Development Agenda as a major event at the WIPO
- in the 80's only 20 national competition authorities (from now on: NCAs), now more than 100 (many in developing countries)
- Competition Law and Policy (Programme)
-- background papers to Intergovernmental Expert Meetings
--- COMPETITION POLICY AND THE EXERCISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/22/Rev.1)
-- technical assistance on demand
-- Peer Review on competition legislation(voluntary)
--- "model" advise on provisions impacting iprs
---- complementarity iprs/competition
---- different tools
---- exclusivities to stimulate innovation,
----- in case of market power, not prohibited per-se, but they could have anticompetitive effects
--- Chapter II, II (a) Scope of application: "goods, services or intellectual property"
-- UNCTAD's mandates in this field
--- Accra Accord
--- Rec. 40 Development Agenda (above)
--- WHO's Global Strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property (2008)
--- foster generic competition immediately after patent's expiry
--- create a competitive environment for generics
- iprs and competition not conflicting
- good competition policy, well run and designed provides for incentives to innovate
-- short-term not always central
- patent system to be procompetitive
-- room for disruptive innovation
-- role of venture capitalists
- both ip system and effective competition ideally provide for innovations
-- but iprs used in defensive (patent portfolio and patent deals) and strategic way
- IF too easy to obtain and enforce, high penalties
-- from a societal point of view, the same level of innovation could be obtained giving less away
-- very expensive for other firms
-- entry barriers high
-- R&D deterred
- IF ipr too difficult to obtain, penalties toothless
-- incentives inefficiently low
--- not worth to invest
-- complex design of secrecy
--- disclosure and diffusion insufficient from a societal perspective (forcep's example: invention non patented and kept secret)
-- iprs targeted because of their success
-- too low incentives, no licensing agreements
-- licensing as masquerade for cartels
-- standard organizations ambushed
-- patent surge, not only because of increased innovation
--- harm to competition?
--- innovation stifled?
-- courts, NCAs to "rebalance" this?
--- expertise needed to do this very high in the face of limited resources available
---- delays, risk of slowing down innovation (overkill)
-- Ip law needs fixing
--- some improvements, grant rates are coming down
- Actions
-- dialogue with patent agencies
-- OECD's role
--- reports
--- seminars, hearings, fora (see 2010 Global Forum on Competition)
-- licensing arrangements
--- most of them at least neutral from a comp policy perspective - technology transfer
--- grantbacks
---- positive: risk sharing, financing
---- negative: possibly in case of exclusive, severable improvements (follow-on innovations deterred)
-- patent pools
--- usually at least neutral
--- positive: complementary, essential iprs
--- negative: possibly when substitute iprs
---- market sharing; cover up for price agreements
---- foreclosure of third parties' technologies
-- "naked" unilateral refusal to license ip (not refusal + like in mergers)
--- OECD members: diverging answers
---- EU, compulsory licence as remedy
---- US, different philosophy
---- most members
----- compulsory licences generally not suitable
----- ip system not always effective
------- but importance of "working around" granted iprs
-- NCA stating licensing terms (e.g. fees) possibly acting as regulator and not as arbiter.
US Dep. of Justice, Antitrust Division
- complex issue
- technological innovations as primary driver of economic growth
- distinction between invention and innovation (inno a longer process)
- complementarity
- ip questions everywhere (enforcement, advocacy, business review letters)
-- within merger proceedings particularly difficult
- tools available
-- prior cases
-- guidelines
-- 2007 Report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, etc.
- coming next: joint public workshop (DoJ, FTC, US PTO) to Explore the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition Policy and its Implications for Promoting Innovation
Evolution in the way of thinking about the interface ip/comp
- 70's patents often considered monopolies, licensing stifled
- 80's rule of reason, licensing seen positively as long as different factors of production are combined (other issue: transaction costs, prod costs, free riding)
- 1995 Guidelines
-- no special rules for iprs
-- patents not presumption of market power (Supreme Court agrees in 1996)
-- market power not enough
-- benefits of licensing
--- combination of productive assets
-- focus on certain restraints
-- counterfactual licensing analysis
--- potential comp
--- likely to decrease comp
--- reduction of incentives to innovate
---- but: much less practice sofar with socalled dynamic efficiencies (theoretical challenge)
-- per se area
- international convergence on the basis of an increasingly common economic approach
- ipr/comp: no real conflict, both promoting innovation
-- open markets a very good incentive for innovation
-- competition policy as an element of a broader legal framework for innovation
--- a market that rewards present innovation without stifling future innovation
- innovation can be very risky,
-- but differences according to the markets under consideration
--- patent, less important in software business (seen often by market participants as obstacles to
- strategic use of patents increased
--pharma sector
--- strategic, possibly anticompetitive
- "probabilistic patents", Shapiro (and Lemley)
-- patents as lottery tickets
- patent reform could take care of it ?
- standards setting
-- benefits, interoperability, etc
-- but risks of abuse of market power
--- de facto, formal
- Microsoft Europe
-- withholding the interoperability info (not an ip case as such: patents covering interoperability info "found" by MS very late in the proceeding)
-- innovation incentives much discussed in court proceedings
--- issue possibly exceptional because it has to do with interoperability
-- in substance not so different from the US Microsoft decision on remedies (also compulsory licence of interoperability info)
- Rambus