CPIP, here.
Monday, October 24, 2016
Sunday, October 23, 2016
Saturday, October 22, 2016
The Sharing Economy - What It Is, Examples, And How Big Data, Platforms And Algorithms Fuel It
Forbes, here.
(Not much substance, but many cute examples of SE platforms)
(Not much substance, but many cute examples of SE platforms)
Friday, October 21, 2016
The app market could be the next target for US antitrust regulators
BusinessInsider, here (not the most precise of all articles, but the news is there).
Thursday, October 20, 2016
Poverty and decision-making: How behavioural science can improve opportunity in the UK
K. Gandy, K. King, P. Streeter Hurle, C. Bustin and K. Glazebrook, here.
The European Handbook for Teaching Privacy and Data Protection at Schools
G. González Fuster and D. Kloza (eds.), here.
Wednesday, October 19, 2016
Resolution on Human Rights Defenders
The 38
th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, here.
Behavioral Considerations for Effective Time-Varying Electricity Prices
I. Schneider, C. Sunstein, here.
Tuesday, October 18, 2016
Public Policy Forum on the Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study
Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Video here.
Antitrust Enforcement Under A (Further) Clinton Administration: Status Quo Or Significant Change?
McDermott Will & Emery, here.
Monday, October 17, 2016
Sunday, October 16, 2016
Saturday, October 15, 2016
Friday, October 14, 2016
Thursday, October 13, 2016
Wednesday, October 12, 2016
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Conference on the preliminary findings of the e-commerce inquiry - A few very selective and biased notes
EC, 6 October 2016.
Programme here.
Catch-up video here.
Some notes on my favourite Session (S3).
Bundeskartellamt (7:02:30)
- Asics Decision here.
-- prohibition to sale via marketplaces: no agreement on this specific issue with the EC, feu vert on the others
--- total ban not expressly prohibited in the decision (obiter dictum para. 40: "Des Weiteren sind den autorisierten Händlern im ASICS-Vertriebssystem 1.0 die Bewerbung und der Verkauf über Online-Marktplätze per se – d.h. unabhängig von der konkreten Ausgestaltung des jeweiligen Marktplatzes – verboten. Auch wenn darüber mit Blick auf die vorgenannten und hier festgestellten Kernbeschränkungen nicht mehr entschieden wird, könnten nach Auffassung des Bundeskartellamts auch durch dieses Verbot viele ASICS-Händler daran gehindert werden, mehr und andere Kunden auch außerhalb ihres engen geographischen Vertriebsgebiets schnell und effektiv über das Internet zu erreichen").
- Widespread pressure on retailers towards RPM: How do we deal with that?
- Lego, dual-pricing settlement
-- conditions shaping the quality of the distribution of Lego products both on- and offline
- Tasks based on the findings and NCAs' case law
-- find a balance between extreme views,
-- keen interest in fostering innovation at the retailers' level and the manufacturers' level (a whole book and a couple of articles written on this, SV, here and ici),
-- seek level playing field (and EU Courts are going to help)
--- CJEU Coty here.
---- Deuter here.
Discussion Round (NCAs and input from the audience)
- Geoblocking, territorial restrictions
-- P fragmented e-commerce sector; are restrictions/barriers always justified? Like restrictions on passive sales? Consumer associations complain. Geoblocking Reg might help to fill some possible gaps. EC better placed to deal with it, but NCAs dealing with ban on passive sales within national territory (Galp Energia - bottled gas decision here) - also online.
-- NL not so many complaints - differently from D (should the NL NCA somehow start worrying about it?). Geo-blocking Reg: many issues (applicable law, extension to b2b - territorial supply restraints, etc.)
-- D no complaints on geo-blocking from within D. Cooperation with other NCAs within the ECN (with LUX on car sales - info about this case not found)
--S territorial restrictions, complaints received, not acted upon (imports from lower priced countries banned), EC better placed (if banished within the ECN based on cooperation among some Members risk of consumers in high priced countries better off and in low priced countries worse off - balance necessary, ergo EC's task)
- Marketplace, selective distribution
-- NL tension between price comp by retailers and quality driven manufacturers; in general VR are efficient (protect manufacturers' investments, ok if interbrand competition),
-- S new knowledge: marketplaces' use by retailers much lower in S than in D, bans much less prevalent than in D (not sure)
-- P selective distribution cases not frequent (not even offline)
-- D selective distribution systems may go beyond what is necessary to generate efficiencies, for example imposing bans of third party platforms, quite a lot of litigation before D courts - NCA's intervention therefore necessary to influence the shaping of competition policy (otherwise D courts will shape it totally on their own)
--- Adidas (here) and Asics both included bans of third party platforms: marketplaces are important sales channels for smaller retailers (pretty sure about this one) - 2/3 of their sales.
--- perhaps more a political than an economic question: marketplace shops by both manufacturer and retailer on the same platform - refusal to supply if the latter continues (I would add: see also CMA online posters case, here)
-- e-commerce a priority in D and ECN rather active, EU courts progressing as well (who is missing here?)
-- NL free-riding by manufacturers possibly also an issue (p.105) - "striking" to him "a little bit of an eye-opener"
-- D possible free-riding by manufacturers also to be considered, debate within the NCA itself very useful to decide borderline cases; in general, intervention by CAs can also reduce complexity (answering to Baker&McKenzie)
- Online price transparency, RPM
-- NL, S, no red line for intervention, interest in parallel systems (but which one do you decide to face, practically?)
-- P price transparency a problem in markets prone to collusion - algorithms possibly helping in this regard (US poster case mentioned but strangely not the parallel UK case...)
--- new instruments necessary to tackle collusion in online markets (e.g., data screening employed in the Libor cases)
--- dual pricing and minimum RPM to offset retailers' free-riding strategies, efficiency allegation not grounded (Royal Canin, here)
--- RPM: companies should consider alternative, less restrictive vertical restraints
-- D not stuck to one brand of assessment framework, and making available instruments fit for the online world; case by case inevitable: evolution by interpretion
--- VRBER setting the scene and not easy to circumvent
---- Courts might challenge provisions
-- NL digital content: premium content increasingly important, particularly in an oligopolistic market (merger commitment decision here)
--- market study into the online streaming video sector launched (looking at the issues from various angles; French study also just published, here)
Programme here.
Catch-up video here.
 |
| Contribution from academia (S2) |
Some notes on my favourite Session (S3).
Bundeskartellamt (7:02:30)
- Asics Decision here.
-- prohibition to sale via marketplaces: no agreement on this specific issue with the EC, feu vert on the others
--- total ban not expressly prohibited in the decision (obiter dictum para. 40: "Des Weiteren sind den autorisierten Händlern im ASICS-Vertriebssystem 1.0 die Bewerbung und der Verkauf über Online-Marktplätze per se – d.h. unabhängig von der konkreten Ausgestaltung des jeweiligen Marktplatzes – verboten. Auch wenn darüber mit Blick auf die vorgenannten und hier festgestellten Kernbeschränkungen nicht mehr entschieden wird, könnten nach Auffassung des Bundeskartellamts auch durch dieses Verbot viele ASICS-Händler daran gehindert werden, mehr und andere Kunden auch außerhalb ihres engen geographischen Vertriebsgebiets schnell und effektiv über das Internet zu erreichen").
- Widespread pressure on retailers towards RPM: How do we deal with that?
- Lego, dual-pricing settlement
-- conditions shaping the quality of the distribution of Lego products both on- and offline- Tasks based on the findings and NCAs' case law
-- find a balance between extreme views,
-- keen interest in fostering innovation at the retailers' level and the manufacturers' level (a whole book and a couple of articles written on this, SV, here and ici),
-- seek level playing field (and EU Courts are going to help)
--- CJEU Coty here.
---- Deuter here.
Discussion Round (NCAs and input from the audience)
- Geoblocking, territorial restrictions
-- P fragmented e-commerce sector; are restrictions/barriers always justified? Like restrictions on passive sales? Consumer associations complain. Geoblocking Reg might help to fill some possible gaps. EC better placed to deal with it, but NCAs dealing with ban on passive sales within national territory (Galp Energia - bottled gas decision here) - also online.
-- NL not so many complaints - differently from D (should the NL NCA somehow start worrying about it?). Geo-blocking Reg: many issues (applicable law, extension to b2b - territorial supply restraints, etc.)-- D no complaints on geo-blocking from within D. Cooperation with other NCAs within the ECN (with LUX on car sales - info about this case not found)
--S territorial restrictions, complaints received, not acted upon (imports from lower priced countries banned), EC better placed (if banished within the ECN based on cooperation among some Members risk of consumers in high priced countries better off and in low priced countries worse off - balance necessary, ergo EC's task)
- Marketplace, selective distribution
-- NL tension between price comp by retailers and quality driven manufacturers; in general VR are efficient (protect manufacturers' investments, ok if interbrand competition),
-- S new knowledge: marketplaces' use by retailers much lower in S than in D, bans much less prevalent than in D (not sure)
-- P selective distribution cases not frequent (not even offline)
-- D selective distribution systems may go beyond what is necessary to generate efficiencies, for example imposing bans of third party platforms, quite a lot of litigation before D courts - NCA's intervention therefore necessary to influence the shaping of competition policy (otherwise D courts will shape it totally on their own)
--- Adidas (here) and Asics both included bans of third party platforms: marketplaces are important sales channels for smaller retailers (pretty sure about this one) - 2/3 of their sales.
-- e-commerce a priority in D and ECN rather active, EU courts progressing as well (who is missing here?)
-- NL free-riding by manufacturers possibly also an issue (p.105) - "striking" to him "a little bit of an eye-opener"
-- D possible free-riding by manufacturers also to be considered, debate within the NCA itself very useful to decide borderline cases; in general, intervention by CAs can also reduce complexity (answering to Baker&McKenzie)
- Online price transparency, RPM
-- NL, S, no red line for intervention, interest in parallel systems (but which one do you decide to face, practically?)
-- P price transparency a problem in markets prone to collusion - algorithms possibly helping in this regard (US poster case mentioned but strangely not the parallel UK case...)--- new instruments necessary to tackle collusion in online markets (e.g., data screening employed in the Libor cases)
--- dual pricing and minimum RPM to offset retailers' free-riding strategies, efficiency allegation not grounded (Royal Canin, here)
--- RPM: companies should consider alternative, less restrictive vertical restraints
-- D not stuck to one brand of assessment framework, and making available instruments fit for the online world; case by case inevitable: evolution by interpretion
--- VRBER setting the scene and not easy to circumvent
---- Courts might challenge provisions
-- NL digital content: premium content increasingly important, particularly in an oligopolistic market (merger commitment decision here)
--- market study into the online streaming video sector launched (looking at the issues from various angles; French study also just published, here)
On the Importance of Preserving the Consistency and Integrity of the EU Acquis Relating to Content Monitoring within the Information Society
A substantial number of Academics, Open Letter to the EC, here.
Monday, October 10, 2016
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström win the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
Scientific Background, here.
Relevance for antitrust: incomplete contracts, privatization, public/private ownership.
Relevance for antitrust: incomplete contracts, privatization, public/private ownership.
Sunday, October 09, 2016
Saturday, October 08, 2016
Facebook and the Economics of Privacy and Big Data
Oliver Budzinski, Guest Lecture, 14 October 2016, 8.45 AM, Room 3C – Department of Economics and Management, Trento University.
Presentation here.
Presentation here.
An in-depth analysis of how Expedia converts visitors into customers
EconConsultancy, Part One here.
Thursday, October 06, 2016
Wednesday, October 05, 2016
The Next Decade of Data Science: Rethinking key challenges faced by big data researchers
V. Polinski, here.
"data scientists often run the risk of studying what is observable rather than what needs to be studied"
"data scientists often run the risk of studying what is observable rather than what needs to be studied"
Tuesday, October 04, 2016
Market Study Online Video Streaming Platforms
ACM, Video Here.
Well, these online platforms have been around for a while already, but it's true that they're continously evolving. In fact, it's tough to produce a market study in this area that isn't at least partly outdated while the ink is barely dry on it.
Well, these online platforms have been around for a while already, but it's true that they're continously evolving. In fact, it's tough to produce a market study in this area that isn't at least partly outdated while the ink is barely dry on it.
Accelerating the Internet of Things in the UK: Using policy to support practice
RAND, here.
"...the survey results highlight that there is a strong
perception that consumers should be in control of their personal data at all times, signalling a distinctive move towards individuals themselves acting as their own ‘data controllers’."
"...the survey results highlight that there is a strong
perception that consumers should be in control of their personal data at all times, signalling a distinctive move towards individuals themselves acting as their own ‘data controllers’."
Monday, October 03, 2016
Online sales of posters and frames
CMA, Decision, here.
'Maintaining good relationships with customers is a legitimate objective, however where such an objective is achieved by means of an anti- competitive arrangement, that arrangement can be regarded as having an anti-competitive object.'
'Repricing software is normally used by online
sellers to compete with other online sellers by automatically adjusting
the prices of their products in response to the live prices of competitors’
products...However, in the present case the repricing software was
configured by the Parties to restrict price competition between them in
order to give effect to the Infringing Agreement'.
'Maintaining good relationships with customers is a legitimate objective, however where such an objective is achieved by means of an anti- competitive arrangement, that arrangement can be regarded as having an anti-competitive object.'
'Repricing software is normally used by online
sellers to compete with other online sellers by automatically adjusting
the prices of their products in response to the live prices of competitors’
products...However, in the present case the repricing software was
configured by the Parties to restrict price competition between them in
order to give effect to the Infringing Agreement'.
Survey and data gathering to support the evaluation of the Satellite and Cable Directive 93/83/EEC and assessment of its possible extension
Study prepared for the European Commission, here.
Saturday, October 01, 2016
Friday, September 30, 2016
Movie Piracy and Displaced Sales in Europe: Evidence from Six Countries
B. Herz, K. Kiljański, here.
Networks of Control: A Report on Corporate Surveillance, Digital Tracking, Big Data & Privacy
W. Christl, S. Spiekermann, here.
Thursday, September 29, 2016
Principal syndicat professionnel du secteur du mannequinat et 37 agences: entente
Autorité de la concurrence, Décision ici.
Wednesday, September 28, 2016
Using Behavioral Economics and Field Experiments To Make The World A Better Place
Vienna Behavioral Economics Network, here.
Tuesday, September 27, 2016
Monday, September 26, 2016
Friday, September 23, 2016
Thursday, September 22, 2016
Wednesday, September 21, 2016
Tuesday, September 20, 2016
Consolidation and Competition in the U.S. Seed and Agrochemical Industry
US Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, written testimonies here.
Competition for a Fairer Society
M. Vestager, here.
"Here in the United States, the Council of Economic Advisors has warned about the risks of markets that are increasingly dominated by a few large companies".
"Here in the United States, the Council of Economic Advisors has warned about the risks of markets that are increasingly dominated by a few large companies".
Monopolkommission: Hauptgutachten XXI - Wettbewerb 2016
Hier.
Zentralvermarktung in der Fußball-Bundesliga S. 80 ff.
Digitale Märkte: Sharing Economy und FinTechs S. 363 ff.
Zentralvermarktung in der Fußball-Bundesliga S. 80 ff.
Digitale Märkte: Sharing Economy und FinTechs S. 363 ff.
Monday, September 19, 2016
Bundeskartellamt hat keine Einwände gegen App-basiertes Girokonto der Sparkassen
Bundeskartellamt, hier.
"Die gemeinsame Vereinbarung der Sparkassen darüber, die Basisversion des App-Kontos kostenlos anzubieten, könnte eine wettbewerbsbeschränkende Vereinbarung darstellen...Im Rahmen seines Aufgreifermessens hat das Bundeskartellamt entschieden, kein Verfahren gegen die teilnehmenden Sparkassen einzuleiten. Das gemeinsame Vorgehen der Sparkassen erscheint in diesem Fall gerechtfertigt, da so insbesondere auch kleinere Institute die Möglichkeit haben, über die App Neukunden zu gewinnen. Darüber hinaus erscheint es in dem derzeitigen Marktumfeld unumgänglich, die Basisversion eines App-Kontos kostenfrei anzubieten, so dass die Vereinbarung – wenn überhaupt – den Wettbewerb nur geringfügig beschränkt."
"Die gemeinsame Vereinbarung der Sparkassen darüber, die Basisversion des App-Kontos kostenlos anzubieten, könnte eine wettbewerbsbeschränkende Vereinbarung darstellen...Im Rahmen seines Aufgreifermessens hat das Bundeskartellamt entschieden, kein Verfahren gegen die teilnehmenden Sparkassen einzuleiten. Das gemeinsame Vorgehen der Sparkassen erscheint in diesem Fall gerechtfertigt, da so insbesondere auch kleinere Institute die Möglichkeit haben, über die App Neukunden zu gewinnen. Darüber hinaus erscheint es in dem derzeitigen Marktumfeld unumgänglich, die Basisversion eines App-Kontos kostenfrei anzubieten, so dass die Vereinbarung – wenn überhaupt – den Wettbewerb nur geringfügig beschränkt."
Sunday, September 18, 2016
Friday, September 16, 2016
Opérations de visite et saisie inopinées dans le secteur de la fabrication et la distribution des sandwichs
Experiments in Intellectual Property
C. Buccafusco, C. Sprigman, here.
"Inventing a new pharmaceutical or producing a movie takes years of intellectual effort. The creativity that researchers can study in the laboratory, however, may involve minutes or even seconds".
"Inventing a new pharmaceutical or producing a movie takes years of intellectual effort. The creativity that researchers can study in the laboratory, however, may involve minutes or even seconds".
Data Ownership and Access to Data
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Position Statement, here.
Thursday, September 15, 2016
E-Commerce Sector Inquiry: Preliminary Report
Press Release, here. Fact sheet here. Preliminary Report here.
Digital content:
- "the information provided during the sector inquiry... shows that multiple business models and a great diversity of licensing practices are available and indeed used, which can cater for the needs of both right holders and digital content providers";
-"Little substantive evidence was provided on the importance of pre-sale arrangements to fund new products by respondents, in relation to the products included in the sector inquiry."
Digital content:
- "the information provided during the sector inquiry... shows that multiple business models and a great diversity of licensing practices are available and indeed used, which can cater for the needs of both right holders and digital content providers";
-"Little substantive evidence was provided on the importance of pre-sale arrangements to fund new products by respondents, in relation to the products included in the sector inquiry."
E-Commerce Sector Inquiry: Second Batch of Results
"If it is agreements between companies that are restricting e-commerce across Europe’s national borders, then you can expect competition enforcement to follow", speech, 11.09.2015.
My personal "highlights" (from today's press conference):
- investigation into online video games and geo-blocking still ongoing;
- E-commerce sector inquiry and pay-tv case "very, very distant relatives": former much broader (more "generic"), considering also consumer goods where there are ("obviously") the same restrictions but many more (I´d add that, with regard to digital content, restrictions in the licensing agreements well beyond geo-blocking have been identified by the EC);
- E-commerce sector inquiry as a source of information for the legislator (possibly, copyright - and geo-blocking regulation).
Wednesday, September 14, 2016
Bayer and Monsanto to Create a Global Leader in Agriculture
Bayer, here.
"Bayer has committed to a USD 2 billion reverse antitrust break fee, reaffirming its confidence that it will obtain the necessary regulatory approvals".
"Bayer has committed to a USD 2 billion reverse antitrust break fee, reaffirming its confidence that it will obtain the necessary regulatory approvals".
Tuesday, September 13, 2016
Monday, September 12, 2016
Friday, September 09, 2016
Thursday, September 08, 2016
GC: Lundbeck confirmed
T‑472/13, here.
"The ‘scope of the patent’ test is...based on a subjective assessment, by the applicants, of the scope of their patents and of their validity, whereas a national court or competent authority may have taken a different view" (491).
"The ‘scope of the patent’ test is...based on a subjective assessment, by the applicants, of the scope of their patents and of their validity, whereas a national court or competent authority may have taken a different view" (491).
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Centre for a Digital Society , Video here . These are my very rough talking points on pay or okay in full length (more than I actually had...
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On 24 March 2004 the European Commission fined Microsoft for abuse of dominant position (H/T Lewis Crofts). 18 years (age of maturity) l... -
Report to the California Law Review Commission Antitrust Law: Study B-750, here .
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A. Blankertz, hier .
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CMA, here .
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Organized Money, here .
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InternetLab, here .
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Chalmermagne, here .