R. Gutjahr, hier.
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
Monday, March 09, 2015
Saturday, March 07, 2015
Friday, March 06, 2015
Thursday, March 05, 2015
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Tuesday, March 03, 2015
Die Sektoruntersuchung des Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel – Ein Kommentar aus ökonomischer Perspektive
J. Haucap,
U. Heimeshoff,
S. Thorwarth,
C. Wey, hier.
Monday, March 02, 2015
Sunday, March 01, 2015
Friday, February 27, 2015
Thursday, February 26, 2015
Why the Print Catalog Is Back in Style
HBR, here.
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
"instead of sending every customer his brand’s largest book, he looks for frequent website visitors and asks, 'Can I only send her 50 pages, or 20, as a reminder of, ‘Oh, I’ve got to go to the website’?”
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
Unentgeldliche TV-Mitschnitte im Schulunterricht und an Universitäten
Petitionsausschuss des deutschen Bundestages, hier.
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
DOJ Is Right About Apple e-Books
WSJ, here (and below).
The Journal mischaracterizes the trial court’s ruling in the Justice Department’s antitrust case against Apple and five e-book publishers (“All Along the Apple Watchtower,” Review & Outlook, Feb. 17). Specifically, you say that the court found that “allowing consumers to read e-books on the iPad was an antitrust conspiracy.” Not so. The case was about agreements on a vital dimension of competition, namely price. It has long been a universally accepted proposition in both law and economics that agreements among competitors to set and regulate prices are anticompetitive. Thus, the court correctly found the agreements illegal. It is no justification that the agreements were intended to wrest control over the pricing of e-books from Amazon, the dominant player in e-book retailing.
Legitimate competition erodes a dominant firm’s position by offering consumers better prices or products. Here consumers received a worse deal. Indeed, the court found that the agreements led to an almost immediate 18% increase in the average price of e-books—hardly a boon to consumer welfare.
You are on more solid ground as regards the activities of the special master appointed to oversee Apple’s compliance with the verdict. (The publishers settled with DOJ before trial.) Even losing antitrust defendants deserve fairness and a reasonable post-verdict opportunity to show good faith efforts to comply with a court order. As you describe, there is ample evidence that this special master has overreached by placing burdens on Apple that are unnecessary to assuring adherence to the final judgment. As you urge, the Second Circuit should sack the special master or at least rein in his powers.
Theodore A. Gebhard
From social media service to advertising network
ICRI/CIR, in close cooperation with iMinds-SMIT, here.
Monday, February 23, 2015
Model contracts for licensing interoperability information
P. Laurent and B. Jean for the European Commission
DG Communications Networks, Content &
Technology, here (pdf download).
Saturday, February 21, 2015
Google wins dismissal of U.S. lawsuit over Android app limits
Reuters.com, here. Order here.
Footnote 9: "At a higher level of abstraction, this means that those competitors who cannot access users are unable to improve their search algorithms, thereby impairing their ability to compete with Defendant on the merits of their respective search products... This is akin to the theory of Sherman Act § 2 monopoly maintenance described in Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-62, wherein Microsoft’s exclusive licensing terms prevented OEMs from promoting rival Internet browsers, thereby reducing rival browser usage and developer interest in those browsers, with the effect of maintaining developer focus on developing for Microsoft’s Windows operating system, which contributed to maintaining Microsoft’s monopoly over the market for operating systems" (emphasis added).
Footnote 9: "At a higher level of abstraction, this means that those competitors who cannot access users are unable to improve their search algorithms, thereby impairing their ability to compete with Defendant on the merits of their respective search products... This is akin to the theory of Sherman Act § 2 monopoly maintenance described in Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-62, wherein Microsoft’s exclusive licensing terms prevented OEMs from promoting rival Internet browsers, thereby reducing rival browser usage and developer interest in those browsers, with the effect of maintaining developer focus on developing for Microsoft’s Windows operating system, which contributed to maintaining Microsoft’s monopoly over the market for operating systems" (emphasis added).
Friday, February 20, 2015
Thursday, February 19, 2015
Wednesday, February 18, 2015
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Beginnings of the "more technological approach"
1998: "To meet Microsoft’s arguments about the integration of the operating system and the browser, Justice Department lawyers needed to understand how software programs were written...They needed to appreciate the technical characteristics of software code and design, something that Microsoft and its software engineers already understood", in A. Gavil, H. First, The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition Policy for the Twenty-first Century, MIT Press, 2014. A terrific read, see here for a book review - with which I only partially agree, though. Contrary to the reviewer's opinion, I didn't miss the "drama" at all (read the footnotes!). Moreover, there are plenty of references to the economic underpinnings of the Microsoft cases (basically, network economics and the then nascent theory of two-sided markets). However, what I'd have liked to find in the book is also an in-depth discussion of the suitability of the economic theories that played a decisive role in the Microsoft cases for competition policy going forward (legal theories are already depicted by the authors as sufficiently flexible to cope with new challenges). For instance, how solid is the application barrier to entry argument likely to be in other high-tech markets such as mobile?
Why Xiaomi Worries Google
TheInformant, here (only partially accessible without subscription, but already very interesting).
Copyright and the Value of the Public Domain
K. Erickson, P. Heald, F. Homberg, M. Kretschmer and D. Mendis, here.
Monday, February 16, 2015
Consideration of Options for Open Data Licences
Irish Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, here (Word file).
Sunday, February 15, 2015
Saturday, February 14, 2015
Friday, February 13, 2015
Regulation, antitrust and promotion of innovation? Challenges and experiences from communications to payment systems
Thursday 12 March 2015, 18:00 - 19:30 (registration from 17:30)
UCL Laws Graduate Wing, 1-2 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H 0EG
Speakers:
David Evans (Global Economics Group / UCL)
Steve Unger (Ofcom)
Andrea Coscelli (CMA)
Hannah Nixon (Payment Systems Regulator)
John Fingleton (Fingleton Associates)
Chair:
Antonio Bavasso (UCL / Allen & Overy LLP)
UCL Laws Graduate Wing, 1-2 Endsleigh Street, London WC1H 0EG
Speakers:
David Evans (Global Economics Group / UCL)
Steve Unger (Ofcom)
Andrea Coscelli (CMA)
Hannah Nixon (Payment Systems Regulator)
John Fingleton (Fingleton Associates)
Chair:
Antonio Bavasso (UCL / Allen & Overy LLP)
Website here.
Thursday, February 12, 2015
Wednesday, February 11, 2015
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
Ökonomie des Teilens - nachhaltig und innovativ?
T. Theurl, J. Haucap, V.Demary, B. Priddat, N. Paech, hier.
Monday, February 09, 2015
Android and Antitrust: Attempts at a "More Technological Approach"
S. Vezzoso (this blog's author), here.
Saturday, February 07, 2015
Friday, February 06, 2015
Bilan 2014 du marché de la musique enregistrée
Syndicat National de l'édition Phonographique (SNEP), ici.
The Valuation of Unprotected Works: A Case Study of Public Domain Photographs on Wikipedia
P. Heald, M. Kretschmer, K. Erickson, here.
Thursday, February 05, 2015
Wednesday, February 04, 2015
Tuesday, February 03, 2015
Monday, February 02, 2015
Copyright policy and the right to science and culture
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, here (Word File).
Sunday, February 01, 2015
Friday, January 30, 2015
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Privacy and human behavior in the age of information
A. Acquisti, L. Brandimarte, G. Loewenstein, here.
Frank Pasquale unravels the new machine age of algorithms and bots
Passcode.csmonitor.com/frankpasquale, here.
Wednesday, January 28, 2015
Tuesday, January 27, 2015
Monday, January 26, 2015
Sunday, January 25, 2015
Saturday, January 24, 2015
Friday, January 23, 2015
Thursday, January 22, 2015
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
Monday, January 19, 2015
Sunday, January 18, 2015
Saturday, January 17, 2015
Mass Surveilance, Part 2: Technology foresight, options for longer term security and privacy improvements
European Parliamentary Research Service, Study here.
Friday, January 16, 2015
Thursday, January 15, 2015
Wednesday, January 14, 2015
Tuesday, January 13, 2015
Avis relatif aux questions de concurrence concernant certaines professions juridiques réglementées
Autorité de la concurrence, Avis n° 15-A-02 du 9 janvier 2015, ici.
Monday, January 12, 2015
Sunday, January 11, 2015
Digital vs. Print: Reading Comprehension and the Future of the Book
J. Tanner, here.
(missing from the analysis, though: tablets powered by great apps like GoodReader, used indoor and positioned at a convenient angle - moreover, not clearly stated that reading and taking notes with whatever medium are two distinct processes)
(missing from the analysis, though: tablets powered by great apps like GoodReader, used indoor and positioned at a convenient angle - moreover, not clearly stated that reading and taking notes with whatever medium are two distinct processes)
Saturday, January 10, 2015
Friday, January 09, 2015
CAT on the Eurotunnel/SeaFrance merger
Here.
The "very unusual difference in outcome between the application of the UK and
French domestic merger regimes to the same transaction gave rise to some
comment."
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Centre for a Digital Society , Video here . These are my very rough talking points on pay or okay in full length (more than I actually had...
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On 24 March 2004 the European Commission fined Microsoft for abuse of dominant position (H/T Lewis Crofts). 18 years (age of maturity) l...
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Report to the California Law Review Commission Antitrust Law: Study B-750, here .
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A. Blankertz, hier .
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CMA, here .
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Organized Money, here .
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InternetLab, here .
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Chalmermagne, here .