IPlytics, here.
Monday, December 19, 2016
Labour wants tech firms like Google and Facebook to disclose what's under the hood
BusinessInsider UK, here.
How Do App Stores Challenge the Global Internet Governance Ecosystem?
V. Almeida, D. Doneda, C. Rossini, here.
Friday, December 16, 2016
Thursday, December 15, 2016
Wednesday, December 14, 2016
Mind over matter: is scarcity as much about psychology as it is economics?
Bank Underground (Bank of England), here.
Accélérer ensemble la transformation numérique de nos économies
Conférence numérique franco-allemande, ici.
Tuesday, December 13, 2016
Monday, December 12, 2016
Thursday, December 08, 2016
Wednesday, December 07, 2016
Tuesday, December 06, 2016
What are competition authorities talking about when they talk about big data?
OECD Hearing: Providing help to understand big data analytically
Last week, on a sunny and frosty November day (“Cold frost and sunshine: day of wonder! -
Мороз и солнце; день чудесный”),
competition authorities gathered at the OECD in Paris with the intention of
figuring out analytically what big data could mean for competition enforcement.In essence, discussions mainly focused on the impact on competition policy of the massive processing and exploitation of private data for commercial gain. While it goes without saying that big data is already significantly affecting business strategies, both on and offline, the question competition authorities are ever warming to is how big data might affect their own competition enforcement activities.
The topic "Big data: Bringing competition policy to the digital era"
What follows is a brief account of the some of the discussions that took place at the hearing, for personal memory and sharing with my students and other patient @wavesblog readers.
What is data in economic terms?
The classic demand and supply side returns to scale are produced almost automatically (“positive feedback loop”). A critical aspect in the world of
big data, however, is that it is mainly user generated data which directly helps with
product improvement. This specific “return to scale” has also been called a “data
network effect”. For instance, the consumer uses a digitally enabled service
that is connected to the Internet, like Google Maps. In this case, the user is
not only producing the data while using the service so that the supplier of the
service can learn, but the user directly produces the data that enables the
service and improves it in real time. It could be argued that this is a supply
side phenomenon rather than a demand side phenomenon. More specifically, considered
from the supply side, it’s not really a network effect but rather a matter of learning
by doing, as the cost per unit decreases and quality increases as experience
increases. This continuous improvement on the production side would be reminiscent
of the Japanese Kaizen, with its focus on constant learning on how to optimise
production and how to optimise the characteristics of the product to make it
more attractive to user. Experience is
particularly relevant for learning by doing: How long firms have been around
and what they have learned. As such, this supply side phenomenon known as
learning by doing wouldn’t be specific to the data economy but is present in
virtually all industries (“companies from all industries have long sought to improve the relevance of their data, in order to inform their decision making, and better serve consumers”). Differently from more traditional returns to scale,
this type of positive feedback would require a serious investment and
commitment. In particular, learning by doing by online platforms requires data,
hardware, software, tools, and expertise.
In this respect, a really intriguing question discussed at the hearing is whether there is something genuinely new going on here. The user is not only producing the data while using the service, from which the online platform can obviously learn, but the user produces the data that directly contributes to the making available of the service and its improvement in real time.
This specific feedback loop might be something peculiar to the data economy, as using the service has an effect not only on the capacity of the firm to improve the service, but on the capacity of the firm to provide it. Thus, using a digitally-enabled service such as Google Maps would have a direct influence on the production of the service, as if by driving a car the user "might make the car production line goes faster". Consumption would thus be intertwined with production, from the demand side to the supply side.
Is there a data barrier to entry?
The fact that data is relatively cheap and available, or that some companies are better than others at utilising data to extract value, would not seem to exclude per se that there might be serious data-related impediments or even barriers to entry.
Conversely, there is no automatic barrier to entry because of the increasingly importance of data as a parameter of competition.
As seen above, an interesting peculiarity characterizing big data-driven economic sectors is that valuable data is generated by the interaction between the consumer and the digitally-enabled service, that is when the firm is already in the market. In this respect, a distinction should be made between data for entry and data that can be generated only after entry. This would raise the question about the minimum quantity and variety of data necessary in order to enter the specific big data-driven market (a sort of "minimum efficient scale").
At any rate, there seemed to be general consensus that the attention of
competition authorities should be primarily focused on sectors in which a certain quantity/variety of data is indispensable for firms and alternative data sources (such as data brokers) cannot be tapped. Future examples of this situation could arise in the world of so called Industry 4.0, i.e. the trend towards the full computerization of manufacturing where machine directly produce and exchange valuable data.
Should privacy be protected as a component of quality competition?
What is data in economic terms?
Basically, data can be in input or an output. As an input, or
asset, data in digital markets would seem rather on the cheap side in the sense that nowadays there
are inexpensive ways to generate and collect data produced by consumers
while they are connected to the Internet (“web logs, sensors, etc.”). While
firms offering digitally-enabled services get a lot of data almost automatically,
data becomes really helpful and valuable “if it can be turned into information,
knowledge and action”. This type of data analytics requires investment in
complementary assets such as hardware, software, and skilled labour. Arguably, improvements
in terms of value extraction (“information, knowledge and action “) are
directly related to improvements in software and hardware and not only to improvements
in terms of the amount and variety of data that is available.
On the demand side, increasing returns to scale that have attracted
much attention in the case of online platforms such as Google and Facebook are
so called direct and indirect network effects. Here what matters is share: the firm
that has the larger share of users has power, as more users automatically make the
digitally-enabled service more attractive relative to another online platform. On
the supply side, classic returns to scale are often caused by high fixed costs,
entry costs, relatively low marginal costs. In this respect, size is what
matters for supply side economies of scale. The cost per unit decreases as the
quantity produced increases. That said, the digital economy is characterized nowadays
by less fixed costs (thanks to cloud computing, software as a service, freely
available productivity tools, etc.). In this scenario, firms can relatively
easily enter new markets and scale up their business.
In this respect, a really intriguing question discussed at the hearing is whether there is something genuinely new going on here. The user is not only producing the data while using the service, from which the online platform can obviously learn, but the user produces the data that directly contributes to the making available of the service and its improvement in real time.
Is there a data barrier to entry?
The fact that data is relatively cheap and available, or that some companies are better than others at utilising data to extract value, would not seem to exclude per se that there might be serious data-related impediments or even barriers to entry.
Conversely, there is no automatic barrier to entry because of the increasingly importance of data as a parameter of competition.
As seen above, an interesting peculiarity characterizing big data-driven economic sectors is that valuable data is generated by the interaction between the consumer and the digitally-enabled service, that is when the firm is already in the market. In this respect, a distinction should be made between data for entry and data that can be generated only after entry. This would raise the question about the minimum quantity and variety of data necessary in order to enter the specific big data-driven market (a sort of "minimum efficient scale").
At any rate, there seemed to be general consensus that the attention of
Should privacy be protected as a component of quality competition?
With regard to competition enforcement, it is often the case
that quality and innovation concerns that are non-price-related (and therefore not
easily quantifiable) are what should really matter in terms of this policy’s exclusive goal,
i.e. to make competition processes work best in the interest of consumers. In this respect, big data could be like a
canary in the coalmine, i.e. could serve to expose a crucial weakness in the
current antitrust framework.
A more specific question discussed during the hearing is
whether privacy can be treated as a parameter of quality competition. In this
respect, for instance, privacy degradation (i.e., to demand more data than firms
could in a competitive market, or to use data in ways that are contrary to the
consumer’s wishes) could come across as an exercise of market power and,
possibly, as an abuse of dominant position. The CJEU in ASNEF-Equifax held that “(a)ny possible issues relating to the sensitivity of personal data are
not, as such, a matter for competition law, they may be resolved on the basis
of the relevant provisions governing data protection”. Based on the Court’s “as
such” language, the European Commission seems perfectly entitled to look “at big
data and privacy where an antitrust concern may exist”.
Of course, it is not a matter of incorporating privacy concerns into antitrust analysis as such. Only those product/service characteristics that are important to
consumers are likely to be relevant in terms of competition enforcement, as specific practices can only be anticompetitive as long as consumers are negatively affected by them. Therefore,
competition authorities have to decide whether consumers affected by the
practice under analysis see privacy as a significant factor of quality, and
companies compete with each other on this parameter. Thus, with regard to the
Google/DoubleClick merger, the US Competition Authority decided that the
combination of Google’s user search information with consumer data that DoubleClick was collecting
on behalf of the publishers did not enhance Google’s market power in the
intermediation market. The Authority also concluded that privacy as an element
of quality competition would not have been negatively affected by the merger.
From (big) data to (big) market failures?
It is a well-established fact that many users of online
service do not feel in control of their data. If online service providers are
not offering the level of data privacy that consumers would appreciate,
another way to look at this issue is from a more regulatory perspective. In
this regard, it might be helpful to start investigating what could be the current obstacles
to well-functioning data privacy competition. Lack of confidence and trust by
consumers are a matter of interest also to market regulators, especially if this
risks undermining the functioning of digital markets. Thus, for instance, if the maximizing strategy in some digital
markets is the creation of confusion, new entrants committed to transparency do
not necessarily succeed. In other words, if market incentives for transparency and
data privacy are insufficient, a form of procompetitive regulation becomes
necessary.
Another type of possible and potentially significant failure of big data-driven markets
is that, as seen above, consumers are only partially benefiting from the valuable data that they
are producing and that fuels a set of extremely profitable digital
services.
Conclusion
Competition authorities' adolescent fascination with big data has quickly matured into full grown interest and analysis. In any event, new theories of harm and enforcement tools will need to be tested on the basis of real cases. Time might be ripe for more competition enforcement on digital markets.
Conclusion
Competition authorities' adolescent fascination with big data has quickly matured into full grown interest and analysis. In any event, new theories of harm and enforcement tools will need to be tested on the basis of real cases. Time might be ripe for more competition enforcement on digital markets.
Archéologie et concurrence: proposition d'engagements et test de marché
Autorité de la concurrence, ici.
Monday, December 05, 2016
The Innovation Illusion: How So Little Is Created by So Many Working So Hard
F. Erixon, B. Weigel, here.
Thursday, December 01, 2016
Tuesday, November 29, 2016
Monday, November 28, 2016
What are the competition implications of “digital disruption”?
Nortonrosefulbright.com, here (p.17 ff.)
A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors
E. Posner, F.Scott Morton, E. Glen Weyl, here.
Saturday, November 26, 2016
Thursday, November 24, 2016
Wednesday, November 23, 2016
Tuesday, November 22, 2016
Monday, November 21, 2016
Saturday, November 19, 2016
Friday, November 18, 2016
Once again, Siri helps attackers bypass your iPhone’s passcode
Hotforsecurity.bitdefender.com, here.
Thursday, November 17, 2016
Le numérique sous l'angle du droit de la concurrence
I. De Silva, Vidéo ici.
(Assez bizarre...Complètement ignorées les décisions allemandes en matière de rate parity - parité tarifaire).
(Assez bizarre...Complètement ignorées les décisions allemandes en matière de rate parity - parité tarifaire).
Wednesday, November 16, 2016
Tuesday, November 15, 2016
The Ripple Effects of Online Marketplace Bans
A. Ezrachi, here (research supported by the Computer and
Communications Industry Association - CCIA).
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