R.Meier, here.
Tuesday, July 07, 2015
Discovering the Miracle of Large Numbers of Antitrust Investigations in Russia: The Role of Competition Authority Incentives
S. Advasheva, D. Tsytsulina, S. Golovanova, Y. Sidorova, here.
Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity, Choice, and Discrimination
Am.Datta, Michael C. Tschantz, and An. Datta, here.
Monday, July 06, 2015
Sunday, July 05, 2015
Saturday, July 04, 2015
Friday, July 03, 2015
The French, Italian and Swedish Competition Authorities Accept the Commitments Offered by Booking.com
ECN Brief 2/2015, here.
No direct link, hence:
No direct link, hence:
In their investigations of so-called "price parity" clauses (also called "best price" clauses) contained in agreements between online travel agencies (OTAs) and hotels, the French Competition Authority (FCA), the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) and the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) coordinated their investigations and, on 21 April 2015, adopted parallel decisions accepting identical commitments [1] from the market-leading OTA Booking.com and making them binding in their respective jurisdictions. The European Commission assisted the authorities in coordinating their work.
OTAs such as Booking.com operate internet platforms, on which consumers can search for, compare and book hotel rooms free of charge. Hotels only pay commission to the OTA for its services when a booking is made. The price parity clauses essentially require the hotels to offer the same or a better room price on Booking.com's platform as they offer on their other sales channels, including the hotel's own direct sales channels, be it online or offline. This means that Booking.com can raise its commission rate without the risk that hotels will translate this cost increase by offering higher room prices on Booking.com’s platform than on competing OTA platforms. The price parity clause, combined with the fact that hotels generally tend to sign up with several competing platforms, implies that Booking.com has less incentive to compete with other OTAs by charging lower commission rates to hotels than would otherwise be the case. As a result, the price parity clauses may restrict competition between existing OTAs and may lead to higher commission rates, which in turn may translate into higher consumer prices for hotel rooms. Furthermore, the price parity clause may constitute a barrier to entry on the market, by making it more difficult for an OTA to enter or expand on the market by competing with low commission rates in exchange for hotels offering lower room prices on that OTA’s platform. The three national competition authorities (NCAs) launched investigations to ascertain whether the price parity clauses in Booking.com’s agreements with hotels infringed the prohibition of restrictive agreements in Article 101 TFEU and, in the case of France and Sweden, the equivalent national legislation. The FCA’s investigation was also initiated on the basis of a possible infringement of the prohibition against abuse of dominance of Article 102 TFEU and its national equivalent.
In the course of the investigations, Booking.com conducted a customer survey of 14 000 consumers in 9 Member States and produced economic papers to argue, essentially, that parity between room prices in hotels’ own sales channels and prices offered on Booking.com’s platform is important in preventing free-riding on Booking.com’s investments and ensuring the continued supply of search and comparison services free of charge to consumers.
To solve the identified competition concerns, Booking.com offered a first version of commitments that were market tested and subsequently improved. In essence, the adopted commitments prevent Booking.com from requiring hotels to offer better or equal room prices via Booking.com than they do via competing OTAs. In addition, Booking.com cannot prevent hotels from offering discounted room prices provided that these are not marketed or made available to the general public online. The discounted prices can be offered online to members of a hotel’s loyalty scheme and/or via offline channels (e g direct emails, telephone and walk-in bookings).
The three NCAs performed economic analyses of the commitments and concluded that the will meet their competition concerns. The commitments will put pressure on OTAs' commission rates and the quality of service, which will ultimately lead to lower room prices and better services for consumers. The commitments will also make it easier for new OTAs to enter the market and for innovative OTAs to expand.
Following the commitment decision, the Booking.com cases were closed in France, Italy and Sweden. However, the respective competition authorities continue their investigations concerning Expedia’s price parity clauses and in France also concerning HRS's parity clauses.
See further:
[1] The French version of the commitments provides for a mid-term review.
Dutch universities start their Elsevier boycott plan
Vermeer, Brieflezende vrouw in het blauw |
Thursday, July 02, 2015
Wednesday, July 01, 2015
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
Monday, June 29, 2015
Apparently, "everyone" knew of a leaked (online) copy of Google (Search) Statement of Objections - I didn't
With a little help from @wavesblog readers, perhaps?
Is Google Degrading Search? Consumer Harm from Universal Search
M. Luca, T. Wu and the Yelp Data Science Team, here.
Wednesday, June 24, 2015
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Monday, June 22, 2015
Sunday, June 21, 2015
Saturday, June 20, 2015
Uber driver case poses questions for ‘sharing economy’
FT, here.
"The case highlighted a fundamental dilemma for internet companies built on the booming freelance sector. Establishing some level of control over the workers who use their platforms is often essential to ensuring a consistent level of service.
But the further they go — for instance, by laying down standards of training or conduct — the more they lay themselves open to one day being forced to accept the full responsibilities of employers. For the California labour commissioner, Uber’s control of pricing, tipping, driver ratings and the type of car made it look like an employer."
Friday, June 19, 2015
Thursday, June 18, 2015
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
Tuesday, June 16, 2015
Time to stick a fork in these Android competition complaints
Computer & Communications Industry Association, here.
The General Court upholds the registration of the shape of Lego figures as a Community trade mark
Judgments in Cases T-395/14 and T-396/14
Best-Lock Europe (Ltd) v OHIM — Lego Juris, Press Release here.
Monday, June 15, 2015
Report on the remote Ebook Lending Pilots
The Society of Chief Librarians and The Publishers Association, here.
Sunday, June 14, 2015
Saturday, June 13, 2015
Friday, June 12, 2015
Thursday, June 11, 2015
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
Analysing Google's Public Response to the EC's Statement of Objections
Foundem, here.
(Cool interactive presentation, possibly created with Visme - whose licence is a little expensive, though).
(Cool interactive presentation, possibly created with Visme - whose licence is a little expensive, though).
Tuesday, June 09, 2015
Monday, June 08, 2015
Sunday, June 07, 2015
Friday, June 05, 2015
Thursday, June 04, 2015
Tuesday, June 02, 2015
App Maker Files EU Complaint Against Google, Alleging Abuse of Android Dominance
WSJ.com, here.
"Disconnect said Google abused its dominant position in Europe’s mobile market to unfairly discriminate against Disconnect and favor its own privacy and security software. The moves limited Europeans’ access to competing privacy and security software, while letting Google and others track and collect Android users’ information for advertising, Disconnect said...The app maker alleged Google pulled Disconnect because the software disrupted Google’s tracking and advertising efforts, the source of most of the Internet company’s revenue and profit. In an email included in the complaint, a Play store employee said the app was removed because it prevented other apps from delivering ads....A Google spokesman called Disconnect’s claims “baseless.” Google has allowed more than 200 other privacy apps in the Play store, but blocks any apps that alter other apps’ functionality or remove their way of making money, he added, saying Google applies this policy uniformly, with strong support from Android developers...Google abused its dominance in mobile operating systems and the app market by “tying” its own software and security to those platforms, Disconnect said in its complaint. That gave its services an unfair advantage over Disconnect’s rival software, reducing competition and consumer choice in the market for privacy and security software, the developer said. Google’s removal of the app also illegally discriminated against Disconnect because Google’s own privacy and security software, which it includes by default in its Android operating system, isn't held to the same standards, Disconnect argued."
More about Disconnect here.
More about Disconnect here.
Monday, June 01, 2015
Sunday, May 31, 2015
Saturday, May 30, 2015
Friday, May 29, 2015
Thursday, May 28, 2015
How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem”
A. Hobson, C. Koopman, C. Kuiper and A. Thierer, here.
Wednesday, May 27, 2015
Android and Antitrust: Attempts at a “More Technological Approach”
S. Vezzoso (this blog's author), Working Paper here (Wavesblog's readers comments more than welcome).
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thursday, May 21, 2015
Showing films and other audiovisual content in European Schools:Obstacles and best practices
Study prepared for the European Commission, here.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Aperta un'istruttoria sui diritti televisivi della serie A
AGCM, Provvedimento qui.
"Le notizie di stampa in atti sembrano indicare che l’assetto finale per l’assegnazione dei diritti audiovisivi per il triennio 2015/2018 come sopra descritto non discenda da un confronto competitivo fra gli operatori interessati, ma sia stato il frutto di un accordo, realizzato successivamente all’espletamento della gara che ha determinato un esito delle assegnazioni diverso da quello inizialmente risultante dalla stessa procedura di gara".
"Le notizie di stampa in atti sembrano indicare che l’assetto finale per l’assegnazione dei diritti audiovisivi per il triennio 2015/2018 come sopra descritto non discenda da un confronto competitivo fra gli operatori interessati, ma sia stato il frutto di un accordo, realizzato successivamente all’espletamento della gara che ha determinato un esito delle assegnazioni diverso da quello inizialmente risultante dalla stessa procedura di gara".
Monday, May 18, 2015
Saturday, May 16, 2015
Friday, May 15, 2015
Stuttgarter Taxi-Zentrale geht gegen "myTaxi"-App vor
Heise.de, hier.
"Daimler ist außerordentliches Mitglied im Deutschen Taxi- und Mietwagenverband (BZP) und liefert nach Verbandsangaben rund 60 Prozent der Fahrzeuge."
"Daimler ist außerordentliches Mitglied im Deutschen Taxi- und Mietwagenverband (BZP) und liefert nach Verbandsangaben rund 60 Prozent der Fahrzeuge."
Thursday, May 14, 2015
Online Copyright Enforcement, Consumer Behavior, and Market Structure
L. Aguiar, J. Claussen, C. Peukert, here.
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
GC: documents exchanged between the Commission and a national competition authority in proceedings concerning an infringement of the competition rules are not, in principle, accessible to the public
Case T-623/13, Unión de Almacenistas de Hierros de España v Commission, here.
Monday, May 11, 2015
Internet firms: Eat or be eaten
TheEconomist, here.
“The advantage you have with the internet is that the regulatory regimes are not as aware about the dominance you can create in platforms, and therefore you can create monopolies,” says a big investor in internet stocks."
“The advantage you have with the internet is that the regulatory regimes are not as aware about the dominance you can create in platforms, and therefore you can create monopolies,” says a big investor in internet stocks."
Sunday, May 10, 2015
Saturday, May 09, 2015
Friday, May 08, 2015
Sixth Annual Conference on Internet Search and Innovation
Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, June 4-5 2015, Agenda here.
Thursday, May 07, 2015
Le Groupement National des Indépendants (GNI) gagne contre Expedia
Hotellerie.de, ici.
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
"dit que, faute de contrepartie suffisante, les clauses visant à l’obtention automatique des meilleurs conditions tarifaires et promotionnelles, dans les contrats des hôtels incriminés situés sur le territoire français, sont constitutives d’un déséquilibre significatif au sens de l’article L442-6 1 2e et sont nulles", voir TNooz.
(L442-6 1 2e:
Engage la responsabilité de son auteur et l'oblige à réparer le préjudice causé le fait, par tout producteur, commerçant, industriel ou personne immatriculée au répertoire des métiers...de soumettre ou de tenter de soumettre un partenaire commercial à des obligations créant un déséquilibre significatif dans les droits et obligations des parties).
CA Supreme Court on pay for delay
Cipro I & II, here.
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
"We summarize the structure of the rule of reason applicable to reverse payment patent settlements. To make out a prima facie case that a challenged agreement is an unlawful restraint of trade, a plaintiff must show the agreement contains both a limit on the generic challenger‘s entry into the market and compensation from the patentee to the challenger. The defendants bear the burden of coming forward with evidence of litigation costs or valuable collateral products or services that might explain the compensation; if the defendants do so, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the compensation exceeds the reasonable value of these. If a prima facie case has been made out, the defendants may come forward with additional justifications to demonstrate the settlement agreement nevertheless is procompetitive. A plaintiff who can dispel these justifications has carried the burden of demonstrating the settlement agreement is an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act."
"The Hatch-Waxman Act illustrates the law of unintended consequences."
Rival music services say Apple's App Store pricing is anticompetitive
TheVerge, here.
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
"Apple’s rules disallow companies from redirecting users to the browser to get the lower subscription price" : does it vaguely reminds of a narrow APPA?
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CERRE, Video here .
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CPDP.ai, video here here .
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Nationaljournal.com, here .
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Antitrust Digest, here (remember that Ascola 2020 presentation?).
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Autorité de la concurrence, ici .
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Panel, Programme here , Video here .
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Tagesspiegel, hier .