Ifross.org, hier.
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Bruno Lasserre on Competition Policy Attitudes in France
My quick take
on the very interesting speech given today in Trento by the Chairman of the
French Competition Authority.
- Sort
of schizophrenia between consumers (pro) and citizens (more skeptical) towards
competition policy.
- The
glorious days of competition policy in France go back to at least 1791, when guilds (corporations) were suppressed by initiative of the revolutionaries.
- Before
WWII, the attitude in France was generally very positive, at a time in which,
by contrast, Germany was much more in favor of cartelizing the economy.
-
After
WWII: public intervention into the economy much welcomed by French citizens,
competition policy experienced mostly as an external imposition.
-
Leftist
reason to support competition during last political election: fight against
privilege by birth; “equality of chances” (égalité) still very popular.
- Governments
in general less procompetition than members of Parliament because of economic
pressures by big players.
- French
civil servants not believing in competition: 77%; French judges: even more
(figure not disclosed).
- Going ahead, dramatically
important in order to convince citizens of the benefits of competition
policy: private/class actions!
- Draft
bill on class actions in France: too narrow.
- Average loss per mobile phone user due to 2005 telecoms’ cartel: 70 Euro per year (cartel’s duration: 2 ½ y.)Tuesday, April 16, 2013
Friday, April 12, 2013
Thursday, April 11, 2013
USPTO roundtables on software-related patents: materials available
Recordings and presentations here.
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
Tuesday, April 09, 2013
Abuse Of IP Rights Under China's Antitrust Rules: Recent Cases Have A Potentially Serious Impact
McDermott Will & Emery, here.
Microsoft and others file EU antitrust complaint over Android app bundling
TheVerge.com, here.
---------
Two central allegations, it seems:
I
- Android is the dominating mobile operating system (running in 70% of units shipped at the end of 2012)
- Android phone makers wanting to include "must-have" Google apps such as Maps or YouTube are required "to pre-load an entire suite of Google mobile services and to give them prominent default placement on the phone"
- Other apps and services providers are disadvantaged
- Google’s Android is put in control of consumer data on a majority of smartphones shipped today.
II
- Google distributes Android open source operating system for free, i.e. below cost
- this makes it difficult for other providers of operating systems to recoup investments in competing with Google’s dominant mobile platform.
Fairsearch's 2011 White Paper indirectly provides some additional background information to the allegations, see e.g. p. 35: Google is also attempting to monopolize mobile search and search advertising through the Android operating system...According to some, Google is “not trying to make a profit on Android or [its web-browser] Chrome . . . .In essence [by giving Android away for free], they are not just building a moat; Google is also scorching the earth for 250 miles around the outside of the castle to ensure no one can approach it"(reference omitted).
An overview of the other competition complaints filed by Google's competitors (source: Fairsearcheurope.eu, here):
Read also Groklaw's take on the allegations, here.
---------
Two central allegations, it seems:
I
- Android is the dominating mobile operating system (running in 70% of units shipped at the end of 2012)
- Android phone makers wanting to include "must-have" Google apps such as Maps or YouTube are required "to pre-load an entire suite of Google mobile services and to give them prominent default placement on the phone"
- Other apps and services providers are disadvantaged
- Google’s Android is put in control of consumer data on a majority of smartphones shipped today.
II
- Google distributes Android open source operating system for free, i.e. below cost
- this makes it difficult for other providers of operating systems to recoup investments in competing with Google’s dominant mobile platform.
Fairsearch's 2011 White Paper indirectly provides some additional background information to the allegations, see e.g. p. 35: Google is also attempting to monopolize mobile search and search advertising through the Android operating system...According to some, Google is “not trying to make a profit on Android or [its web-browser] Chrome . . . .In essence [by giving Android away for free], they are not just building a moat; Google is also scorching the earth for 250 miles around the outside of the castle to ensure no one can approach it"(reference omitted).
An overview of the other competition complaints filed by Google's competitors (source: Fairsearcheurope.eu, here):
Monday, April 08, 2013
Conceptual Study on Innovation, Intellectual Property and the Informal Economy
WIPO Secretariat and J. de Beer, here.
The Single Market for financial services and competition policy
European Competition Forum 2013, Videos here.
Legal Assessment of Patent Settlement Agreements Containing “Reverse” Payments
R. Subiotto, Presentation here.
Walking the Data Protection Tightrope: The Google Privacy Policy Investigations
Europeanlawblog.eu, here.
Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide
T. Artiga Gonzalez, M. Schmid, D. Yermack, here.
Wednesday, April 03, 2013
The Use of Standard Essential Patents: Competition Policy Issues
S. Vezzoso (this blog's author), Presentation here.
Tuesday, April 02, 2013
The Actavis case before SCOTUS shows that the weak patent issue is system-wide:
Patentprogress.com, here.
Friday, March 29, 2013
Google pledges not to sue open-source users or developers over specified patents
Computerworld.com, here.
Tuesday, March 26, 2013
Sunday, March 24, 2013
The Economic Impact of the Data Protection Regulation in the E.U
L. Christensen, A. Colciago, F. Etro and G. Rafert, here.
Saturday, March 23, 2013
Friday, March 22, 2013
Thursday, March 21, 2013
CJEU Referral in Huawei v. ZTE Concerning FRAND
Here (German).
Ehoganlovells.com, here.
See also Fosspatents.com, here and Juve.de, here (German).
-------------
My quick reading of the CJEU referral, based on the translation of the Court's order as kindly made available by Fosspatents.
The questions essentially revolve around the concept of “willing licensee” against which the SEP (standard essential patent) owner has been seeking an injunction. The concept at issue can obviously have even dramatically different shades and meanings. In fact, it can range from a mere “(oral) declaration in broad and general terms indicating the [the potential licensee’s] willingness to enter into negotiations” to “a binding offer to the SEP owner on terms that the SEP owner cannot refuse without treating the infringer unfairly or discriminatorily”, furthermore requiring that “the infringer, in anticipation of the license he is seeking, already complies with his contractual obligations with respect to past acts of infringement.”
A middle ground could be the requirement that “the infringer has indeed entered into negotiations, such as by, for example, communicating terms and conditions under which he is prepared to conclude a license agreement.”
Ehoganlovells.com, here.
See also Fosspatents.com, here and Juve.de, here (German).
-------------
My quick reading of the CJEU referral, based on the translation of the Court's order as kindly made available by Fosspatents.
The questions essentially revolve around the concept of “willing licensee” against which the SEP (standard essential patent) owner has been seeking an injunction. The concept at issue can obviously have even dramatically different shades and meanings. In fact, it can range from a mere “(oral) declaration in broad and general terms indicating the [the potential licensee’s] willingness to enter into negotiations” to “a binding offer to the SEP owner on terms that the SEP owner cannot refuse without treating the infringer unfairly or discriminatorily”, furthermore requiring that “the infringer, in anticipation of the license he is seeking, already complies with his contractual obligations with respect to past acts of infringement.”
A middle ground could be the requirement that “the infringer has indeed entered into negotiations, such as by, for example, communicating terms and conditions under which he is prepared to conclude a license agreement.”
In the event that “the [infringer's] submission of a binding
offer to conclude a license agreement is a requirement” it would then be
necessary to clarify whether that offer should “involve specific substantive and/or
chronological requirements”, whether it would “have to set forth all of the
commercial terms that in accordance with relevant industry practice are usually
set forth in such license agreements,” and whether it could “be conditioned
upon actual use and/or validity of the SEP-in-suit”. Moreover, “in the event
that the infringer's [precontractual] fulfillment of obligations arising from
the requested license is a requirement” for the finding of a “willing licensee,”
the Court asks whether the infringer could be “required, in particular, to make
disclosures relating to past acts of infringement and/or to pay
[precontractual] royalties”, and, finally, whether the “obligation to pay
[precontractual] royalties” could also “be fulfilled by giving security.”
Open Letter to Vice-President Almunia from 11 Complainants (Foundem/Google)
Searchneutrality.org, here.
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Ofcom.org.uk, here .
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LG Frankfurt am Main, 2-06 O 172/09 (verkündet am 13.05.2009). Lesenswertes aus der Begründung (meine Hervorhebungen): "Vorstellbare ...
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T. McSweeny, here.
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G. Soros, here.
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Los Angeles Times, here .
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Technology Review, here .
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Vereniging van Educatieve en Wetenschappelijke Auteurs (VEWA) v Belgische Staat, Case C‑271/10, 30 June 2011, here .
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EnGadget, here . Qualcomm's Answer and Counterclaims here . -
Deutscher Bundestag, hier . S. auch Entschließungsantrag der Grünen, hier .