Wednesday, September 29, 2010

WIPO's Medium Term Strategic Plan 2010-15

Here.
Concerning the SCCR, strategies include:

               "continuing to support the work of Member States on copyright limitations and exceptions, with a particular focus on improving access for visually impaired and other persons with print disabilities, while accelerating work with respect to access for persons with other disabilities, educational institutions, libraries and archives;

                continuing to support the work of Member States on the protection of audiovisual performances and on the protection of broadcasting organizations;

                exploring the scope for discussion of new issues with important global consequences, such as orphan works or the need for increased cooperation between copyright owners and Internet intermediaries in the making available of legitimate creative content, and encouraging consideration of self-regulatory, as well as formal solutions".

Using Competition Law to Promote Access to Knowledge

Sean Flynn, here.

Monday, September 27, 2010

(American) Football, Copyright, and Innovation

NYT, here.

Copyright law needs a digital-age upgrade

Pamela Samuelson, here, and by the same author et al.  THE COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES PROJECT: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM

Derechos de retransmisión de acontecimientos futbolísticos en España

Apertura de un expediente sancionador por posibles prácticas restrictivas de la competencia, por vincular la reventa de derechos de retransmisión de acontecimientos futbolísticos a la contratación de los servicios de producción y transporte de la señal de partidos de fútbol, Comunicado de Prensa.

Competition for High Tech Employees

US JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REQUIRES SIX HIGH TECH COMPANIES TO STOP
ENTERING INTO ANTICOMPETITIVE EMPLOYEE
SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS, Press Release.

Koexistenz, keine Konkurrenz: Gedruckte Bücher und E-Books ergänzen sich

Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, hier.

EU Commission's Statement on Apple's iPhone policy changes

Google Suggest : le directeur de la publication condamné pour diffamation

TGI de Paris, 8 septembre 2010, ici

Friday, September 17, 2010

Antitrust in the Digital Age: How Enduring Competition Principles Enforced by the Federal Trade Commission Apply to Today’s Dynamic Marketplace

Richard Feinstein, FTC, here.

Open Source and Merger Policy: Insights from the EU Oracle/Sun Decision

Simonetta Vezzoso (this blog's author), hereInternational Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (IIC), Forthcoming.

Abstract:

In Europe the merger between Oracle and Sun raised a series of substantial competition concerns, especially related to the acquisition by Oracle of MySQL, an open source business, and its impact on the database market. In the end, the acquisition was unconditionally cleared by the Commission. The open source nature of MySQL played a decisive role in the competition assessment of the merger conducted by the European competition authority according to the "significant impediment to effective competition" legal test. In this Article we will review the Commission’s decision with the specific aim of determining to what extent the open source nature of MySQL’s business model actually affected the scrutiny of Sun’s acquisition by Oracle under the relevant test. In particular, it will be questioned whether Oracle’s public announcement concerning its future behaviour on the database and related markets can be expected to duly address the concerns voiced by the Commission in the course of the merger proceedings. We will conclude that Judge Easterbrook’s much quoted conclusion that «[t]he GPL and open-source software have nothing to fear from the antitrust laws» may possibly need some qualification.


Content:

I. Introduction
II. The EU Oracle/Sun Merger Decision
1. The legal background
2. The SIEC test in the context of the Oracle/Sun case
3. The SIEC test and MySQL’s open source nature
III. The competition assessment of open source in the context of merger policy: in search of a
balanced approach
IV. Conclusion

Thursday, September 16, 2010

EU Stakeholders Dialogue Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on access to works by people with print disabilities

Here. See also the EU Commission's press release (thanks to Antonella De Robbio for pointing it to me).

UK Joint Merger Assessment Guidelines Released

From the Press Release: "The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and Competition Commission (CC) have today for the first time published joint Merger Assessment Guidelines (...) The publication revises and expands guidance previously contained in several publications issued separately by the two Authorities after the introduction of the Enterprise Act 2002".

When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?

C. Scott Hemphill and Bhaven N. Sampat, here.

Competition in the Evolving Digital Marketplace

US House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and Competition PolicyThursday 9/16/2010.


Written testimonies:
Richard Feinstein (Federal Trade Commission), here.
Geoffrey A. Manne (LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCHOOL),  here
Edward J. Black (Computer and Communications Industry Association), here.
Mark Cooper (Consumer Federation of America), here
Morgan Reed (Association for Competitive Technology), here
Scott Cleland (Precursor LLC), here.

Monday, September 06, 2010

ACTA's draft agreement (reflecting August 2010 changes)

From KEI, here.

Antitrust Formalism is Dead! Long Live Antitrust Formalism!: Some Implications of American Needle v. NFL

Judd E. Stone II, Joshua D. Wright, here.

WIPO Seminar Series on “The Economics of Intellectual Property”: Hal Varian (Google) on Copyright and Transaction Costs

Program, Geneva, September 14, 2010. Presentation and Video of the Seminar.

Thwack!! Take That, User-Generated Content!: Marvel Enterprises v. NCSoft

Carl Michael Szabo, here.

Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How Water Law Suggests a Solution to Copyright's Orphan Works Problem

Joel Sage, here.

A Peek Behind the Curtain of the Texas Antitrust Complaints against Google

Groklaw, here.

Rachat par la coopérative agricole Sodiaal du groupe Entremont autorisé

D'après le Communiqué "Avec l'acquisition du groupe Entremont, Sodiaal deviendra le numéro 2 sur le marché de la collecte de lait en France, derrière le groupe Lactalis. Les fournisseurs auxquels cette coopérative fera face sur ce marché seront cependant ses propres adhérents et l'Autorité a rappelé que ce contexte assurait un équilibre des relations entre vendeurs et acheteur, les éleveurs bénéficiant de leur position de sociétaires et de la sécurisation de leurs débouchés."

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

Post Oracle-Sun Merger: OpenSolaris' fate revealed (and what about Oracle's public announcement)?

Here.
From the Oracle-Sun merger decision, para 182:
"Although, with the exception of points 1, 2 and 3 (see below paragraph 184), Oracle's
public announcement is not legally binding on Oracle, the Commission considers that
the strong specificities of open source software and the vibrant ecosystem surrounding
MySQL provide for a self-enforcing mechanism ensuring that Oracle would not have
the ability and incentives to deviate from its announced future conduct. Reputation and
trust is of utmost importance for the sponsor of an open source project which depends
on contributions by a large ecosystem of users, developers and customers. After the
merger Oracle will become the sponsor of a number of significant open source projects
of Sun, including Java, MySQL and OpenSolaris, and will as such need to gain and
retain the trust from the open source community. In this respect, it can be expected that
all of the public pledges made by Oracle to reassure MySQL users, developers and
storage engine vendors will be subject to close scrutiny from the open source
community."
Was the EU Commission somehow slightly too optimistic?

Wednesday, August 11, 2010

Friday, July 23, 2010

Technology and competition, Contributions in honour of Hanns Ullrich

Technology and competition - Technologie et concurrence. Contributions in honour of / Mélanges en l'honneur de Hanns Ullrich - Laurence Boy, Reto M. Hilty, Josef Drexl, Christine Godt, , Bernard Remiche, Editeur : Larcier, ISBN : 978-2-8044-3521-9, 746 pages

My book review (to be published in Revue Internationale de Droit Economique, 2010/2). 

"On ne doute pas que les lecteurs découvriront avec beaucoup de plaisir et d’intérêt le liber amicorum Technology and Competition – Technologie et concurrence, dédié avec admiration et affection à Hanns Ullrich, rédacteur en chef de cette revue,  Professeur au Collège d’Europe, Professeur émérite à l’Université de Munich et à l’Institut Européen de Florence, par des amis, des collègues et des anciens élèves à l’occasion de son 70ème anniversaire. Apparu sous la direction de Josef Drexl, Reto M. Hilty, Laurence Boy, Christine Godt et Bernard Remiche, cet ouvrage riche et passionnant rend un hommage sincère à cet éminent juriste au rayonnement européen et plus vaste encore.
Au cœur de la réflexion scientifique de Hanns Ullrich figurent la promotion du progrès technologique et la sauvegarde de la libre concurrence, deux enjeux juridiques et économiques majeurs annoncés par le titre même des Mélanges qui viennent de lui être offerts. Généralement, c’est le système de propriété intellectuelle, et plus particulièrement de propriété industrielle, qui est censé promouvoir le progrès technologique. La tâche de protéger le jeux de la concurrence dans toutes ces dimensions revient en revanche au droit de la concurrence. Toutefois, comme l’a rappelé dernièrement Hanns Ullrich dans les pages de cette revue, les deux corps de droit sont loin d’être parfaitement indépendants l’un de l’autre. Bien au contraire, l’octroi de droits exclusifs de propriété intellectuelle se doit d’être reconnu et éclairé avant tout par son intégration dans l’ordre concurrentiel de marché.  Il n’est donc pas surprenant que le droit de la concurrence soit régulièrement appelé au secours, dans le but de corriger une insuffisance éventuelle du fonctionnement du système de protection de la propriété intellectuelle, surtout de « surprotection » allégée. Cependant c’est avant tout en formulant des limites intrinsèques à la protection qui soient efficaces et appropriés que le système de propriété intellectuelle est censé assurer sa fonctionnalité et songer à son acceptation.
De toute évidence, la tâche qui revient au droit de la propriété intellectuelle n’est pas facile à accomplir, comme en témoignent plusieurs des contributions rassemblées dans la première partie de l’ouvrage, intitulée «Trop de protection de la propriété intellectuelle?».  Pour ce qui est par exemple du droit des brevets, face à un élargissement excessif de la définition d’invention brevetable, on aurait délaissé l’intérêt général au maintien du domaine public du savoir, c'est-à-dire de la source principale de nouvelles connaissances protégeables et non protégeables. Il en serait pas moins inquiétant pour les critères d’exception à la protection, trop souvent conçus d’une façon insuffisante et interprétés trop rigidement  pour pouvoir offrir un remède efficace aux risques de « surprotection ». Par ailleurs, ainsi que la jurisprudence communautaire en matière de droit des marques l’a maintes fois accompli en s’appuyant sur le concept de « concurrence non faussée », dans plusieurs cas il suffirait probablement d’interpréter et d’appliquer le droit de la propriété intellectuelle dans une véritable perspective de libre concurrence. Mais il est aussi indéniable que depuis quelques années, comme soulignent  plusieurs contributions, les technologies et de leurs besoins de protection changent plus rapidement que dans le passé et qu’il y a eu une transformation non négligeable des modes d’exploitation des droits de la propriété intellectuelles, il suffit de penser à la commercialisation de l’invention en tant que telle et à la exploitation sous forme immatérielle des œuvres protégés, par exemple les programmes d’ordinateurs. En outre, des nouveaux modèles économiques d’innovation ont émergé, voir par exemple le mouvement open source dans l’industrie de l’informatique. Par conséquent, le législateur pourrait être appelé à corriger les déficits systématiques de protection par modification de la réglementation-cadre avec plus de fréquence, mais aussi peut-être moins d’assurance, qu’auparavant.
Les contributions de la deuxième partie, intitulée « Protéger la concurrence », s’accordent pour souligner que le droit de la concurrence non plus n’est épargné par profondes mutations et tensions. D’une part, on assiste à une convergence assez poussée entre régimes nationaux de concurrence au sein de la Communauté Européenne, même si des différences, parfois « regrettables », résistent, par exemple le maintien, si ce n’est accentuation, du caractère politique du contrôle des opérations de concentration en France. De l’autre, on peut douter que l’approche dite  « plus économique » du droit de la concurrence, affichée depuis plus d’une décennie par la Commission européenne,  ait véritablement amené à une analyse des pratiques restrictives plus cohérente, rigoureuse et efficace. Ce qui est évident, en revanche, c’est que la nouvelle approche a servi parfois à légitimer une démarche « pro-active » de politique industrielle en vue d’objectifs préétablis. Or, il n’est pas surprenant de remarquer que parmi les amis et collègues de Hanns Ullrich plusieurs seraient favorables à une renaissance du concept de la « liberté de concurrence », si cher à la doctrine économique dynamique allemande et à l’école autrichienne.
La rencontre annoncée entre droit de la propriété intellectuelle et droit de la concurrence a enfin lieu dans la troisième partie de l’ouvrage (« Propriété intellectuelle et droit de la concurrence »). Traditionnellement, la politique communautaire de la concurrence s’est beaucoup intéressée aux pratiques d’exploitation par contrat des droits de propriété intellectuelle.  Mais c’est surtout l’analyse de l’exercice unilatéral de ces droits au service de la position dominante, notamment pour la défendre ou pour la renforcer, en particulier par des pratiques d’éviction du marché, qui est très controversée de nos jours.  Relativement sous-développée au contraire est l’analyse des enjeux que pose la propriété intellectuelle au contrôle des opérations de concentration. Les contributions réunies dans cette partie de l’ouvrage, s’attachant donc directement au rapport entre droit de la propriété intellectuelles et droit de la concurrence, offrent des éclairages très utiles sur des questions clés, à la fois juridiques et économiques. Or, il se peut que sur ces thèmes les insuffisances de l’approche économique actuelle, enracinée comme elle l’est dans la pensée économique néoclassique, se fassent davantage ressentir, comme on le montre très justement dans l’étude dédié aux restrictions au commerce parallèle des produits pharmaceutiques.
Le miroir scientifique de Hanns Ullrich qui sont ces Mélanges, n’auraient pas pu s’achever sans une partie consacrée au « Droit International », autre thème sur lequel s’est penché ce savant aux talents et aux intérêts multiples. La « protéiforme » mondialisation des pratiques commerciales, comme le savent très bien les lecteurs de cette revue, présente des enjeux aussi difficiles que cruciaux. Les contributions ici regroupées, tout en témoignant de cette complexité, invitent à se ressourcer à la dimension intimement éthique de toute réflexion juridique engagée, ce qui n’est pas le moindre mérite de l’ouvrage".

The UK Competition Commission has published its Annual Report

Here.

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Monday, July 19, 2010

Friday, June 25, 2010

Settlement In DRAM Case

From the Maryland Attorney General press release: “The settlement provides restitution for consumers and state and local government agencies who paid more for computers and other electronic devices because of the price-fixing scheme.”

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Viacom v Google on the Interpretation of DMCA "safe harbor" provision

Here. As the U.S. District Judge Louis Stanton put it, "the critical question is whether the statutory phrases “actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) mean a general awareness that there
are infringements (here, claimed to be widespread and common), or rather mean actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individual items".
According to the judge, "if a service provider knows (from notice from the owner, or a “red flag”) of specific instances of infringement, the provider must promptly remove the infringing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the infringement. General knowledge that infringement is “ubiquitous” does not impose a duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for infringements."

Tuesday, June 22, 2010

Monday, June 21, 2010

WIPO SSCR/20: More on Limitations and Exceptions

WIPO's Second Analytical Document on Limitations and Exceptions. See US' Draft Consensus Instrument on needs of persons with print disabilities. See also EU's Draft Joint Recommendation concerning the improved access to works protected by copyright for persons with a print disability.
US' declaration at SSCR/20: need to keep an holistic approach on L&E; need to move forward swiftly. US' draft consensus instrument as initial step.
In the meanwhile, the US distributed a Background Paper and FAQs (submitted as an information document) on the proposed consensus instrument.
See a comparison of the four proposals presently being discussed (limited to aspects concerning persons with disabilities, the "African Proposal" covers further matters). The wording of the Conclusions was so  controversial, that no agreement could be reached. As the WIPO bravely puts it, "(D)uring a late night discussion, agreed language for final conclusions proved elusive. Member states had divergent views on the wording for future work on the scope of an international instrument relating to exceptions and limitations, and on whether and when informal consultations should take place on the protection of broadcasting organizations. Discussion on all these issues will continue at the next session of the SCCR from November 8 to 12, 2010."

Berliner Rede zum Urheberrecht

Rede der Bundesministerin der Justiz Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger. Mehr zum geplanten Leistungsschutzrecht für Verlage

Wednesday, June 09, 2010

Three-Strike in practice

UK Ofcom, Online Infringement of Copyright and the Digital Economy Act 2010: Draft Initial Obligations Code

Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines: "Some" Economists' Comment

Here, see also the list of all the comments received so far. Interestingly, also the Russian Competition Authority decided to express its view

Monday, June 07, 2010

Friday, May 28, 2010

Revised competition rules for motor vehicle distribution and repair in the EU

Commission Regulation (EU) 461/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector. See also the press release.

On the United/Continental Airlines Merger

US Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommmittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights.

Discussing the Goals of Competition Law

The 5th ASCOLA Conference “Goals of Competition Law”, May 27-29, 2010
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Bonn, Germany.

Open Access in Italy

Report 2009, Paola Gargiulo, Maria Cassella.

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Jane Ginsburg on Mandatory Copyright Formalities


The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 311 (2010), p. 311.

DRAM producers fined € 331 million for price cartel

Press release. It is also the first settlement decision adopted by the European Commission according to Articles 7 and 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (Q&A) .

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Tuesday, May 11, 2010

On the concept of ‘fair compensation’ in the InfoSoc directive

Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-467/08 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores (SGAE) v PADAWAN S.L., from the press release: "Where a Member State, such as Spain, opts for a system of compensation in the form of a levy on digital reproduction equipment, devices and media, such a charge can be regarded as a compensation scheme for private copying which is compatible with the directive only where it may be presumed that those equipment, devices and media are to be used for making private copies. Remuneration which is granted to rightholders as a result of the indiscriminate application of such a levy to undertakings and professional persons, who from experience purchase digital reproduction devices and media for purposes other than private use, is not ‘fair compensation’ within the meaning of the directive".

Some highlights from the WIPO Symposium on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy

The program has slightly changed because Ricardo Machado Ruiz, Commissioner, Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), Ministry of Justice, Brasilia could not attend (volcanic ash).
Some very subjective, sketchy notes (parts in blue are my forthright adds):

WIPO:
- trying to bring together two communities (ipr experts/competition experts; national competition authorities/national ip offices)
- ipr-competition not antagonistic
- well-balanced ip also very important
- WIPO's mandate to work on the interface ip/competition stemming from the Development Agenda in particular, Recommendations 7 23 and 32 (briefly: technical cooperation on the interface between iprs and competition policies; promote pro-competitive ip licensing practices; exchange of national and regional experiences and info, see also document CDIP4_CDIP/4/4 Rev. - Project on Intellectual Property and Competition Policy).
-- outcome envisaged: no formal conclusions or recommendations
-- new division on ip/competition established
-- technical assistance (already requested by Syria)
- iprs are not monopolies, they are not a "necessary evil" but, and foremostly, a differentiation/identification tool (i.e. not
only about creations and inventions)
-- insofar, at the very core of competition and rivarly,
- iprs inherently procompetitive, but only in the right dosage (inter alia, Magill based on a "wrong" copyright)
-- not easy; necessary trials and errors, institutional/legal experiments, picking out the efficient solutions
- difference between an abuse of ip that results into anticompetitive effects and another which does not (reference to a case concerning a patent for irradiating food stuff increasing its vitamin c content and the legal issues thereof involving the important principle of access to health)
- interoperability ip/comp.


WTO:
- very supportive of WIPO's project
- TRIPs allows for a certain freedom in this area, but countries very often are not using it
-- but TRIPs leaves some questions unanswered (e.g., evaluative standards to anticompetitivess)
-- WIPO, WTO, OECD should provide some more help in this respect
-- collective guidelines could be helpful, based on enforcement experience, study and reflection
- ipr/comp interwoven
-- well designed ip systems already address (most) competition concerns internally (i.e., patentability criteria)
- TRIPs, articles 40, 31, 31.k, 8.2
-- art. 40.2 permissive rather than prescriptive (list non-exhaustive)
-- art. 31 (compulsory licences)
--- detailed conditions
--- protecting the legitimate interest of the right holder
-- art. 31.k (competition
policy "shortcut"): "...use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive"
--- unanswered question:decision taken by the head of a national competition authority is an "administrative process"?
- but compulsory licences not always the appropriate remedy
- clash of remedies possible
-- e.g. Microsoft
--- compulsory licence in the EU, "leak" across other jurisdictions

---- before deciding on remedies, possible repercussions should be carefully investigated
- Problems
-- clusters of blocking patents
-- standards-reinforced patents
-- gene patents
-- grantbacks, but depending on circumstances
- overtime convergence on some issues not easy but possible (globalized world - risk of spillover effects)
-- conflicts likely to be increasingly significant, also at the remedies level
--- NCAs likely to oppose "hard" convergence

UNCTAD:
- Recommendation 40 ("To request WIPO to intensify its cooperation on IP related issues with United Nations agencies, according to Member States’ orientation, in particular UNCTAD, UNEP, WHO, UNIDO, UNESCO and other relevant international organizations, especially the WTO in order to strengthen the coordination for maximum efficiency in undertaking development programs")
- Development Agenda as a major event at the WIPO
- in the 80's only 20 national competition authorities (from now on: NCAs), now more than 100 (many in developing countries)
-
Competition Law and Policy (Programme)
-- background papers to Intergovernmental Expert Meetings
---
COMPETITION POLICY AND THE EXERCISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (TD/B/COM.2/CLP/22/Rev.1)
-- technical assistance on demand
-- Peer Review on competition legislation(voluntary)
--- "model" advise on provisions impacting iprs
---- complementarity iprs/competition
---- different tools
---- exclusivities to stimulate innovation,
----- in case of market power, not prohibited per-se, but they could have anticompetitive effects
-- Model Law on Competition (2007)
--- Chapter II, II (a) Scope of application: "goods, services or intellectual property"
- IP field
-- UNCTAD's mandates in this field
--- Accra Accord
--- Rec. 40 Development Agenda (above)
--- WHO's Global Strategy and plan of action on public health, innovation and intellectual property (2008)
-- "wider" lense, not only violations of competition provisions
--- foster generic competition immediately after patent's expiry
--- create a competitive environment for generics

OECD:
- iprs and competition not conflicting
- good competition policy, well run and designed provides for incentives to innovate
-- short-term not always central
- patent system to be procompetitive
-- room for disruptive innovation
-- role of venture capitalists
- both ip system and effective competition ideally provide for innovations
-- but iprs used in defensive (patent portfolio and patent deals) and strategic way
--- competition policy should not "destroy" the value of iprs, but the relationship can at times be complicated
- IF too easy to obtain and enforce, high penalties
-- from a societal point of view, the same level of innovation could be obtained giving less away
-- very expensive for other firms
-- entry barriers high
-- R&D deterred
- IF ipr too difficult to obtain, penalties toothless
-- incentives inefficiently low
--- not worth to invest
-- complex design of secrecy
--- disclosure and diffusion insufficient from a societal perspective (forcep's example: invention non patented and kept secret)
- IF competition policy too strong
-- iprs targeted because of their success
-- too low incentives, no licensing agreements
- IF competition policy too weak
-- licensing as masquerade for cartels
-- standard organizations ambushed
- balanced approach: a tough policy question, to be answered in a real world setting
-- patent surge, not only because of increased innovation
--- harm to competition?
--- innovation stifled?
-- courts, NCAs to "rebalance" this?
--- expertise needed to do this very high in the face of limited resources available
---- delays, risk of slowing down innovation (overkill)
-- Ip law needs fixing
--- some improvements, grant rates are coming down
- Actions
-- dialogue with patent agencies
-- OECD's role
--- reports
--- seminars, hearings, fora (see 2010 Global Forum on Competition)
- Some selected topics
-- licensing arrangements
--- most of them at least neutral from a comp policy perspective - technology transfer
--- grantbacks
---- positive: risk sharing, financing
---- negative: possibly in case of exclusive, severable improvements (follow-on innovations deterred)
-- patent pools
--- usually at least neutral
--- positive: complementary, essential iprs
--- negative: possibly when substitute iprs
---- market sharing; cover up for price agreements
---- foreclosure of third parties' technologies
- areas of controversy
-- "naked" unilateral refusal to license ip (not refusal + like in mergers)
--- OECD members: diverging answers
---- EU, compulsory licence as remedy
---- US, different philosophy
---- most members
----- compulsory licences generally not suitable
----- ip system not always effective
------- but importance of "working around" granted iprs
-- NCA stating licensing terms (e.g. fees) possibly acting as regulator and not as arbiter.
- "Convergence" very difficult at the global level, more likely are regional patches

US Dep. of Justice, Antitrust Division
- complex issue
- technological innovations as primary driver of economic growth
- distinction between invention and innovation (inno a longer process)
- complementarity
- ip questions everywhere (enforcement, advocacy, business review letters)
-- within merger proceedings particularly difficult
- tools available
-- prior cases
-- guidelines
-- 2007 Report, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, etc.
- coming next: joint public workshop (DoJ, FTC, US PTO) to Explore the Intersection of Patent Policy and Competition Policy and its Implications for Promoting Innovation
Evolution in the way of thinking about the interface ip/comp
- 70's patents often considered monopolies, licensing stifled
- 80's rule of reason, licensing seen positively as long as different factors of production are combined (other issue: transaction costs, prod costs, free riding)
- 1995 Guidelines
-- no special rules for iprs
-- patents not presumption of market power (Supreme Court agrees in 1996)
-- market power not enough
-- benefits of licensing
--- combination of productive assets
-- focus on certain restraints
-- counterfactual licensing analysis
--- potential comp
--- likely to decrease comp
--- reduction of incentives to innovate
---- but: much less practice sofar with socalled dynamic efficiencies (theoretical challenge)
-- per se area
- 2007 Guidelines
- international convergence on the basis of an increasingly common economic approach

EU Commission, DGCom
- ipr/comp: no real conflict, both promoting innovation
-- open markets a very good incentive for innovation
-- competition policy as an element of a broader legal framework for innovation
--- a market that rewards present innovation without stifling future innovation

- innovation can be very risky,

-- but differences according to the markets under consideration

--- patent, less important in software business (seen often by market participants as obstacles to

- strategic use of patents increased

--pharma sector

--- strategic, possibly anticompetitive

- "probabilistic patents", Shapiro (and Lemley)

-- patents as lottery tickets

- patent reform could take care of it ?

- standards setting

-- benefits, interoperability, etc

-- but risks of abuse of market power


--- de facto, formal

- Microsoft Europe

-- withholding the interoperability info (not an ip case as such: patents covering interoperability info "found" by MS very late in the proceeding)

-- innovation incentives much discussed in court proceedings
--- issue possibly exceptional because it has to do with interoperability
-- in substance not so different from the US Microsoft decision on remedies (also compulsory licence of interoperability info)

- Rambus

-- patent ambush, standard setting: locked-in (unreasonable royalties) (for a recent comparative approach see Fischmann: Die Pflicht zur Lizenzerteilung in Patent-Ambush-Fällen nach deutschem und europäischem Kartellrecht, GRUR Int 2010, 185)
-- decision on commitments appealed by Rambus' competitors

- Draft Horizontal Guidelines deal extensively with Standardisation Agreements (in part. pp. 66-81)

- Merger analysis

-- dynamic analysis,

innovative efforts

-- to be decided on the facts on each case

- in any case, competition policy should not be less effective in difficult economic times